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SHOW ME THE MONEY: THE
DOMINANCE OF WEALTH IN DETERMINING
RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IN ASIA
RANDALL PEERENBOOM*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, Asia has emerged as one of the most contested sites
for the increasingly powerful international human rights movement. Most
notably, the heavily politicized Asian-values debate called into question the
universal pretensions of the international human rights regime.1 More
fundamentally, the experiences of Asian states over the last five decades
challenged two widely held if somewhat inconsistent views: first, that
democracy was the key to economic growth, or, reversing the causal
direction, that economic growth would inevitably lead to political reforms,
democratization and better protection of human rights. Many Asian states
experienced their periods of rapid growth under authoritarian governments,
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1. For an overview of the debates, see Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and
Relativism: The Evolving Debates over "Values in Asia," 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2003)
[hereinafter Beyond Universalism and Relativism]. See also MICHAEL D. BARR, CULTURAL POLITICS
AND ASIAN VALUES: THE TEPID WAR 1 (2002) (providing an excellent overview from a political,
historical and religious perspective, while arguing that the debates over Asian values are far from over
as Asian countries attempt to negotiate their own form of modernity); THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) (discussing perspectives on the
"Asian values" debates and exploring possible solutions to the human rights challenges in East Asia);
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL
REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun eds., 2000).
Although the term "Asian values" is not often invoked these days, concerns about differences in
values and other circumstances continue to surface in ongoing discussions about democratization, rule
of law and human rights in ways that belie the confident assertions that Asian values existed solely in
the minds of authoritarian government leaders. Larry Diamond, How People View Democracy:
Findings from Public Opinion Surveys in Four Regions (Jan. 11, 2001), at http://www.stanford.edu/
~ldiamond/papers/howPeopleViewDem.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (noting that democracy does
not always work, and that democratic consolidation depends on values for which there are regional
differences and most importantly on good governance and economic growth); see generally Randall
Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1 (Randall
Peerenboom ed., 2004) [hereinafter ASIAN DISCOURSES].
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including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia and
still today China. Moreover, while some Asian states have made the
transition to multiple-party, competitive-election democracy, others have
not, including China, Hong Kong, Vietnam and Myanmar. Still others,
including Singapore, Malaysia and Cambodia, exist in a limbo state
variously described as soft authoritarianism, semi-dictatorship, semidemocracy or nonliberal electoral democracy. Even those states that have
most fully embraced democracy, including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan,
Thailand and more recently Indonesia continue to interpret and implement
human rights in ways that differ in important respects from some Western
liberal democracies, thus calling into question the extent to which they
should be described as liberal democracies.
In addition, the international human rights community has focused on
several Asian countries because of their poor records, especially in the area
of civil and political rights, and in China’s case, also because of its size and
geopolitical importance.2 Post 9-11, Asian states, several with large
Islamic populations, have come under scrutiny as the U.S.-led war on
terrorism has renewed concern that some states would reinstate or make
greater use of broad national security laws to undermine the civil liberties
of not only suspected terrorists, but political dissidents and even ordinary
citizens.
Past discussions about human rights and values in Asia have been
hampered by the lack of reference to empirical studies to back up the strong
theoretical, and in some cases polemical, claims being made on both sides
about the differences or lack thereof in fundamental values. Numerous
multiple-country quantitative studies have demonstrated significant
regional effects with respect to democratization,3 labor rights,4 women’s
rights,5 personal integrity rights,6 freedom from government intrusions, rule
2. For the argument that China is subject to a double standard, see Randall Peerenboom,
Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101 (2005).
3. Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, Autocracy by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of
Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era, paper presented at the annual meeting of The
American Political Science Association, Boston, Aug. 28 – Sept. 1, 2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup.
org/Site/papers/045/045008WayLucan.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
4. Layna Mosley & Saika Uno, Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Foreign Direct
Investment and Human Rights, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science
Association, Boston, Aug. 28 – Sept. 1, 2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/046/046005
MosleyLayn.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (finding a strong regional relationship between regions and
labor rights, and that the Asian and Pacific regions were not as protective of labor rights as Western
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, although they were more protective than the Middle East, North
Africa and Latin America, and on par with Sub-Saharan Africa).
5. Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women's Economic and Social Rights Achievement, 20(1) HUM.
RTS. Q. 139, 163-65 (1998) (finding that regional coefficients play a larger role than GNP in the
achievement of women's economic and social rights, although the regional identification of Asian and
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of law and good governance,7 and cultural values8 that in turn affect rights
performance.9 Although these studies generally define Asia very broadly,
frequently deal with rights in a very general way, and give rise to numerous
methodological issues, they are invaluable in locating Asian countries
within a larger comparative context and in providing an empirical basis to
sort out some of the claims about Asian values.10 They do not, however,
generally measure the degree of variance in rights performance within Asia,
or attempt to explain the variation within Asia or why Asia as a region
might differ from other regions.
In Part I, I provide an empirical overview of the performance of
twelve Asian countries11 with respect to physical integrity rights, civil and
political rights, social and economic rights and other indicia of quality of
life including poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy, primary school
African explains less variation than the Middle East regional designation; and noting that various
literatures suggest that the explanation lies in "culturally specific attitudes towards women's status,
developed under differing historical and economic conditions.").
6. Steven C. Poe et al., The Abuse of Personal Integrity in the Eighties: Regional Perspectives,
paper presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference at the University of
Colorado, Boulder, June 20-21, 1997 (unpublished manuscript, on file with journal); see also David
Reilly, Diffusing Human Rights, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, available at http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004) (noting significant and persisting regional differences in personal integrity
rights). All references to APSA papers for 2003 are available at this cite [hereinafter APSA].
7. Amir Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of Rule of Law and Other Norms of
Governance (June 9, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8. See generally Peter B. Smith et al., Cultural Values, Sources of Guidance, and their Relevance
to Managerial Behavior - A 47-Nation Study, 33(2) J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 188 (2002)
(summarizing various multiple country studies that find similarities on various dimensions of values
within the Asian region, particularly along the dimensions of individualism versus collectivism,
autonomy versus social embeddedness, and hierarchy versus egalitarianism).
9. Frank B. Cross, International Determinants of Human Rights and Welfare: Law, Wealth or
Culture, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 276-77 (1997) (finding that cultural values are an important
determinant of rights and that Western nations have a higher level of freedom from government
intrusion even after controlling for GDP and other factors).
10. For example, the World Bank's good governance study includes, in the East Asian region,
Brunei, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kiribati, North and South Korea,
Laos, Macao, Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Papa New Guinea, the
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, the Salomon Islands, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and
Vietnam. It includes, in the South Asian region, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Fortunately, the interactive database does provide information on
individual countries and allows one to select up to 20 countries for comparison. See Daniel Kaufmann
et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (Apr. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3_wber.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
11. The twelve Asian countries include low, middle, and high income states; a wide range of
political regime types; countries whose rights records vary widely; and countries from East and
Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the group is biased toward (North) East Asia, does not include former
Soviet republics, and does not include the countries with the worst legal systems or human rights
records, such as Laos, Cambodia, or Myanmar.
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enrollment, government expenditures on education, health and military,
quality of governance measured in terms of regulatory effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, and law and order
and social stability as reflected in crime rates and the number of drug users,
suicides, divorces and young mothers.12 I also include several other
countries from different parts of the world for comparison points, focusing
in particular on the United States and France.13
Notwithstanding shortcomings in the data and other well-known
limitations of empirical studies,14 the empirical overview demonstrates a
12. I do not address the rights of the criminally accused. Nor do I focus directly on labor rights,
rights of women, or environmental rights. For a discussion of labor issues in Asia, see LAW AND
LABOUR MARKET REGULATION IN EAST ASIA (Sean Cooney et al. eds., 2002). For women's rights, see
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP Gender-related Development Index (2003 statistics),
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_196_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004),
and UNDP Gender Empowerment Measures (2003 statistics), available at http://www.undp.org/
hdr2003/indicator/indic_207_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). The UNDP database also includes
information on ratification of environmental treaties, use of energy, and other environment-related data.
13. I focus on the U.S. and France as comparison points to show that there are differences even
within economically advanced liberal democracies on a range of specific rights issues and to avoid
over-idealization of rights performance in Western countries. Although the U.S. and France score
higher on many rights indicators than many other Western countries, and thus are not representative of
the region as whole, they are far from perfect in many areas, especially when it comes to economic,
social, and cultural rights. Furthermore, to the extent that legal institutions matter to the protection of
rights, the U.S. (a common law country) and France (a civil law country) differ in significant ways,
including with respect to constitutional review, and both have been influential as sources of legal
transplants. Several of the legal systems in Asia were modeled on the French civil law system.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has exerted considerable influence on the legal systems of Japan and the
Philippines, and has attempted to exert influence more broadly across the region, albeit with limited
success, through an aggressive human rights foreign policy.
14. On the advantages and disadvantages of empirical studies, see Todd Landman, Comparative
Politics and Human Rights, 24(4) HUM. RTS. Q. 890, 896-97 (2002); Russel Lawrence Barsh,
Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 87, 90-98(1993);
Kenneth Bollen, Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights
Measures, 1950-1984, 8(4) HUM. RTS. Q.567, 569-72 (1986).
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntrye has argued that differences in cultural narratives and the
contingent circumstances of countries preclude a science of universal human rights. ALASDAIR
MACINTRYE, Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?, in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE
AGE 260-79 (1971). Other critics argue that human rights attach to individuals, and aggregating
violations and ranking countries on a scale of better to worse may cause us to lose sight of individuals
and the fact that any violation is morally significant. See John McCamant, A Critique of Present
Measures of Human Rights Development and an Alternative, in GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC
POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES 123, 124-32 (Ved P. Nanda et al. eds.,
1981) (suggesting that the use of "societal-level concepts" is preferable to aggregating the violations of
different human rights).
Choosing, operationalizing, and measuring the dependent variable (rights) and the independent
variables (democracy, culture, institutional features such as judicial independence, etc.) have all proven
challenging. Attempts to develop a composite measure to rank countries for human rights performance
have failed because countries generally protect some rights better than others and because of the
controversial normative judgments inherent in prioritizing rights: how does one compare the arrest of a
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person advocating democracy with the lack of medical care for AIDS victims or children being sold
into sexual slavery?
Accordingly, most studies attempt to measure one or more distinct type of right. Some types of
rights, however, are more difficult to measure than others, either because of problems operationalizing
the right or because of lack of data. Another concern has been that quantitative studies, reflecting the
normative biases of the Western-dominated human rights regime, have focused excessively on civil and
political rights to the detriment of other rights. The over-emphasis on civil and political rights is
particularly problematic for present purposes, in that Asian governments often claim that they do better
when judged by economic and social rights and measures that indicate a high quality of life, such as
effective governance, political stability, and low crime rates. This concern is echoed by those who
argue that "rights talk" is itself impoverished, and that rights must be complemented if not supplanted
by discourses of duties, needs, wants, and/or capabilities. For a useful discussion of rights and needs,
see Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 87 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996). For capabilities, see
Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997), and Amartya
Sen, Capability and Wellbeing, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds.,
1993).
Because rights may be subject to various limitations by law, and are implemented to varying
degrees in practice, rights must be scored along a continuum. Different researchers, however,
operationalize the same right in different ways, relying on a number of different factors to produce a
composite score. In producing a composite score, they inevitably rely on debatable assumptions about
the relationship between the various factors and how they should be weighted and aggregated. Similar
problems exist with respect to some of the most common independent variables. Democracy, for
example, has been defined and measured in a variety of ways. See generally Kenneth Bollen, Issues in
the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45(2) AM. SOC. REV. 370 (1980) (discussing the
limitations of several existing indices of democracy, and presenting a revised index incorporating
political liberties and popular sovereignty indices); Gerardo Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing
and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 (1) COMP. POL. STUD. 5 (2002)
(reviewing existing democracy indices, and concluding that no single index successfully responds to the
challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation); Christian Davenport & David
Armstrong, Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis of the Third Wave
(2002), at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/011/011002ArmstrongD.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2004) (examining a variety of statistical methods that measure the relationship between democracy
and state repression).
In the end, quantitative studies are only as good as the data. Unfortunately, data on human rights
compliance is far from ideal. Many countries do not keep accurate records of human rights violations.
The coding of data often involves considerable subjective judgment, and in some cases has been
politically biased, especially in U.S. State Department reports that are less critical of allies than nonallies. Given the time-consuming nature of collecting and coding data, researchers have relied heavily
on a relatively small number of data sources. For an overview of various data sets and approaches, see
Michael Haas, Empirical Dimensions of Human Rights, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 43 (Stuart S. Nagel and David Louis Cingranelli eds., 1996).
Perhaps the biggest drawback to most quantitative studies is that they are of limited use to
policymakers. Many studies, because of their generality, do not provide information that policymakers
can act on. Informing policymakers that war is a threat to personal integrity rights will not help them in
preventing or ending wars. Economic factors may be the most important determinant of better human
rights performance overall, but economists have long been stumped as to how to ensure sustainable
economic growth. The inconsistency of results among empirical studies, especially when more specific
variables are introduced, further reduces their practical utility. For instance, studies of the effect of FDI
(foreign direct investment) on human rights performance have been inconclusive: some have found that
there is no significant relationship, others have found that FDI is weakly or in some cases strongly
associated with better protection of rights, and some have found that increased FDI has a negative
impact on rights protection. In response to criticisms of excessive generality, researchers have
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wide variation in Asia with respect to rights performance. At the same
time, patterns emerge with respect to lower scores for civil and political
freedoms among East Asian countries and higher scores for social and
economic rights as well as good governance, law and order, crime control
and social stability. These patterns are consistent with aspects of the
“Asian values” platform that emphasize the importance, if not the priority,
of social and economic rights relative to civil and political rights.
Similarly, the studies suggest that even in Asian democracies the liberal
emphasis on the individual will often take a back seat to collective interests
and social stability. However, the wide variation within Asia still requires
an explanation.
Accordingly, Part II examines several possible explanations for the
wide variation among Asian countries. Clearly the story is complicated. A
number of factors come into play, with some factors more important for
different types of rights or playing a different role in different countries or
at different times within a country. War, political regime type, the nature
and level of development of legal institutions, population size, colonial
history, religion and cultural factors all play a role. In several countries,
ethnic diversity, religious tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism
or separatist movements have had a major impact on rights policies and
performances. However, consistent with the empirical evidence globally,
by far the most important explanatory factor is wealth, except with respect
to physical integrity rights, for which domestic conflict is the biggest
factor.15
attempted to test the impact of more specific variables on a wider range of more specific rights.
However, the proliferation of studies has led to inconsistent and counterintuitive results.
Policymakers are also likely to be troubled by the normatively unappealing implications of many
quantitative studies. What, for example, is a rights-inclined policymaker to do with the studies showing
Islam to be negatively correlated with democracy and human rights protection? Should the goal be to
repress Islam, and if so, how?
On the whole, quantitative studies are useful in demonstrating general patterns, but there are
always exceptions to the general rules. How the various factors will play out in a given country at a
given time often requires a more detailed qualitative study of that particular state. Qualitative studies
are able to provide a deeper and more nuanced account of economic, political, and legal reforms and
their relation to human rights protection. As a result, they may provide a better sense of what the main
obstacles are to better rights performance in a particular context, and thus offer more useful policy
guidance.
This article should be read in conjunction with THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY], which provides a more detailed
empirical account by examining legal cases and social-political events relating to a range of specific
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in the twelve Asian countries chosen here with
comparisons to the U.S. and France.
15. William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 (2)
HUM. RTS. Q. 368, 393-94 (1996) (GNP biggest contributor to civil, political, social, and economic
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The implications are twofold. First, comparing a lower-middle
income country such as China to the U.S. makes about as much sense as
comparing a piano to a duck. Countries should be compared to other
countries at a similar income level to determine how well they are doing
given the available resources. Second, there is considerable merit to the
Bangkok Declaration emphasis on the right to development and the Asianvalues emphasis on economic growth. Although money is not everything,
it is essential. In the subtle and complex interplay of economics, politics,
culture, law and institutions in determining rights performance, what
matters most is wealth. Put bluntly if somewhat too simply, if you want
better performance across a range of rights and indicators of human
wellbeing, show me the money.
II. A PROFILE OF TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES,
FRANCE AND U.S. ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF RIGHTS
The tables in this Article provide a snapshot summary of performance
on a variety of rights and other indicators of wellbeing for the region as a
whole as well as the countries in this study and other selected countries
from around the world as comparison points. The studies define variables
in different ways, use different data sets, rely on data from different years,
are subject to wide margins of error, and so on. Thus, the tables are no
substitute for more in-depth studies. Nevertheless, they are useful in
providing a general sense of the range of difference within Asia on rights
issues, and also in showing how Asian states compare to other states in
other parts of the world at similar stages of economic, political and legal
development.
A. Physical or Personal Integrity Rights
Physical or personal integrity rights refer to the number of political
prisoners, extra-judicial killings, incidences of torture and arbitrary
detentions. They are among the most basic of rights. They tend to be
subject to wide variation by year in a particular country because wars and
rights). See also GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS,
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251-53 (2d ed. 2001) (wealth was the main
factor affecting rights compliance, although individualism mattered in rich countries); Steven C. Poe et
al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study
Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 310 (1999) (discussing the significant impact of
civil war on personal integrity abuses); Apodaca, supra note 5, at 160 (higher GDP associated with
better performance on women's rights); Steven Poe et al., supra note 6 (discussing the impact of
domestic and international conflicts on the regional development of personal integrity rights); Neil J.
Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations,
40 WORLD POL. 476, 497 (1988) (higher levels of economic wellbeing associated with better physical
integrity rights records).
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political crises may arise or end suddenly. For instance, despite thousands
of complaints of torture and police brutality every year, the U.S. had one of
the best records in 1996, enjoying a level-1 ranking, indicating a country
under a secure rule of law, where people are not imprisoned for their
political views, and torture or political murders are rare or exceptional.16
However, it has since been demoted to level 2 because of the detentions of
suspected terrorists in Guatanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan and the secret
arrests of thousands, including many Muslims, in the U.S.,17 which
constitute arbitrary detention under the ICCPR.18 Level 2 indicates a
limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However,
few persons are affected, and torture and beatings are exceptional. Political
murder is rare. Whether the U.S. will drop further as a result of the reports
of widespread torture of Iraqis and others captured in the war on terror
remains to be seen.
Notwithstanding ups and downs within countries, there has been no
improvement globally in personal integrity violations in recent decades.19
16. See AMNESTY INT'L, United States of America: Rights for All, 17, 19, 26, 43 (1998), available
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510351998?open&of=ENG-USA (last visited Oct.
30, 2004) ("There is a widespread and persistent police brutality across the USA. Thousands of
individual complaints about police abuse are reported each year . . . . Police officers have beaten and
shot unresisting suspects; they have misused batons, chemical sprays and electro-shock weapons; they
have injured or killed people by placing them in dangerous restraint holds . . . . Common forms of illtreatment are repeated kicks, punches or blows with batons or other weapons, sometimes after a suspect
has already been restrained or rendered helpless. There are also complaints involving various types of
restraint hold, pepper (OC) spray, electro-shock weapons and firearms . . . . [V]ictims include not only
criminal suspects but also bystanders and people who questioned police actions or were involved in
minor disputes or confrontations.").
17. Thomas Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond the
Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33,
59 (Campbell Public Affairs Institute, ed., 2003), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/
opengov/Chapter%202.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). See also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS:
DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 25-26 (2003)
(noting that of the estimated 5000 people arrested by May 2003, not one had been charged with
involvement in the attacks on Sept. 11 and only a handful have been charged with terrorist-related
crimes).
18. Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1, 10-15 '(2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 678-79' (2002).
19. James A. McCann & Mark Gibney, An Overview of Political Terror in the Developing World,
1980-1991, in POLICY STUDIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15, 23-24 (Stuart S. Nagel & David
Louis Cingranelli eds., 1996) (noting that political terror increased in the developing world in the 1980s
and finding that democracy does not by itself ensure low levels of terror); see also Reilly, supra note 6,
at 16 (over the period from 1976-1996, the number of countries with the best score actually decreased,
countries with the worst score increased, while the mean remained about the same); Todd Landman,
Norms and Rights: A Non-Recursive Model of Human Rights Protection, paper presented at the annual
meeting of The American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA,
supra note 6 (noting an increase in violations of personal integrity and torture between 1985 and 1993).
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As expected, in the Asian region, there are more violations of personal
integrity rights where there is political instability, rebel insurgencies and
terrorism, as Figure 1.1 shows.20 At level 4, India remains a major trouble
spot, due largely to ethnic and religious tensions.21 China scores poorly
because of the high incidence of torture, arbitrary detentions and the arrests
of democracy advocates, labor unionists and others who oppose
government policies.22 Indonesia, even after democratization, continues to
experience widespread personal integrity violations, consistent with the
efforts to restore order in Aceh, Papua and Maluku provinces and to
prevent terrorism in the country.23 South Korea performed surprisingly
poorly in the mid-1990s, due apparently to violent protests by students and
labor organizations. At level 3, it is on par with Malaysia, which was
ranked higher in 1996 but which has suffered in recent years under the
threat of terrorism and rising Islamic fundamentalism.
Vietnam scores higher than might be expected. Vietnam and Thailand
both received a level-2 rating based on Amnesty International reports and a
level-3 rating based on U.S. State Department reports. Thailand, however,
has recently experienced violent clashes between the government and
Islamic groups in some Muslim-dominated southern provinces, leading to
the imposition of martial law in the region.24 Singapore merits a level-2
rating, reflecting the use of defamation laws to rein in high profile
opposition figures and the reliance on tough national security laws and
other nonliberal laws to crack down on terrorists, people inciting ethnic
conflict, drug traffickers and other criminals. Only Taiwan receives the
highest level-1 score.
20. Linda C. Keith & Steven C. Poe, Personal Integrity Abuse during Domestic Crises, paper
presented at annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, Boston, Aug. 29-Sept. 1,
2002, at http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/046/046004PoeSteven0.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2004) (also noting previous studies finding that civil war and then violent rebellion lead to more
violations of personal integrity rights).
21. Level 3 indicates extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment.
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or
without a trial, for political views is accepted. At level 4 the practices of level 3 are expanded to larger
numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on
this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. At level 5, the terrors of level
4 are expanded to the whole population. The leaders place no limits on the means or thoroughness with
which they pursue personal or ideological goals. Mark Gibney, Notes on Levels of Political Terror
Scale, available at http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/Notes%20on%20
Levels%20of%20Political%20Terror%20Scale.doc (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
22. For a more thorough discussion of China's rating and the argument that a level-4 rating
overstates the problems, see Peerenboom, supra note 2.
23. Hikmahanto Juwana, Human Rights in Indonesia, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra
note 14.
24. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of "Thailand Incorporated (Inc.)," in THE
RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14.
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B. Civil and Political Rights
The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability scale incorporates a
number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process,
civil liberties and political rights, including the right to participate in the
selection of government representatives and the independence of the
media.25 The East Asia region falls squarely in the middle among all
regions as shown in Table 5.1. However, there is a considerable range
within the Asian region as indicated in Figure 2.1. Japan and Taiwan score
reasonably well, though not as high as the U.S. and France, whereas
Vietnam and China are in the lowest 10%.
As suggested by Figure 4.1 and confirmed by other studies discussed
below, civil and political rights are closely related to wealth. Nevertheless,
East Asian countries with a Confucian influence, even if democratic, tend
to do poorly relative to income level.26 Japan, Taiwan, Singapore,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, China and Vietnam all underperform relative to
income.27 In contrast, South Korea, India, the Philippines, Thailand and
recently Indonesia outperform the average in their income class.28
C. Social and Economic Rights: Poverty Measures
China and other Asian governments have attacked the bias of the
international rights community in emphasizing civil and political rights
over the right to subsistence, economic rights and the right to development.
How well do Asian states do on these other dimensions?
Figure 3.1 presents the UNDP rankings for social and economic rights
in 2002 as measured by the Human Development Index. The HDI
measures the average achievement in a country in three basic dimensions: a
long and healthy life based on life expectancy at birth; education and
knowledge measured by adult literacy and combined primary, secondary
and tertiary enrollments; and a decent standard of living as measured by
GDP per capita ($PPP). As one would expect, wealthier countries
25. The following data is obtained from Kaufmann et al., supra note 10, available at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
26. A chart comparing a country's performance to the average performance in its income class can
be readily generated using the World Bank interactive data set by simply selecting the country and the
good governance indicators, or selecting several countries for a particular indicator, and then selecting
"income category average." As the chart is easy to generate but messy and hard to read without the
color-coding provided on the World Bank website, I have not reproduced the chart here. The chart is
available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
27. Other Asian countries that underperform relative to income are Myanmar, Laos and North
Korea. Id.
28. Other Asian countries that outperform the average are Mongolia, Cambodia and East Timor.
Id.
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everywhere, including in Asia, generally have better HDI scores, with
wealth constituting a more important factor than the nature of political
regime.
However, the general composite measure fails to tell the whole story.
Higher levels of economic development and riches for some are consistent
with an impoverished life for many others. Asia as a region has been
relatively successful over the last decade in reducing poverty, defined as
the admittedly minimalist standard of living on less than $1/day. In
contrast, poverty in other regions has increased or remained more or less
the same.29
The performance of the East Asian region is somewhat deceptive in
that the results are skewed by the remarkable performance of China, which
lifted 150 million, 12% of the population, out of poverty in just nine years.
To be sure, even within China, poverty remains an issue in some regions,
with some 16% still living on less than $1/day. Moreover, the income gap
is growing, between urban and rural residents, and also between those
urban residents with the education and skills needed to succeed in a market
economy and those without them. There are also recent signs that some
may be slipping back into poverty and that conditions for the very poorest
may be worsening.
Table 1.1 shows three ways of measuring human poverty. One
approach measures the percentage of the population below the national
poverty line defined as what that society considers necessary to satisfy
basic needs. Because countries will set the poverty line at different levels,
a wealthier, welfare-conscious country may have a high percentage living
in poverty and appear poorer. The second approach measures the
percentage of the population below uniform poverty lines of $1 and $2 per
day. Even when adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), this incomebased approach cannot fully capture actual differences in the standard of
living of poor people.
While the first two approaches measure
consumption and income, a third approach measures the impact of poverty
directly. The Human Poverty Index quantifies poverty in terms of life
expectancy, access to food and water, and education as measured by
literacy rates.
Ultimately, it pays to look at the three measures concurrently. For
example, nearly half of the Chinese population lives on less than $2 per
day. But the actual standard of living in China, as measured by the HPI,
exceeds countries with higher income such as Iran and South Africa.
29. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 41
tbl. 2.3, available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_chapter_2.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2004).
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Asian countries vary dramatically in levels of poverty. India is by far
the worst, though poverty remains a problem in Vietnam, Indonesia, the
Philippines, China and Thailand. However, some countries are doing fairly
well in reducing poverty relative to the number of people with very low
incomes, including China, the Philippines and Vietnam. Others have been
doing poorly, especially Thailand, but also Indonesia. Thailand, however,
has improved recently as a result of economic growth and a strong ruling
party that, while democratic, has followed the lead of other successful
Asian states in focusing on economic rights even if at the expense of civil
and political rights.
Of course, relative and even absolute poverty remains an issue in
developed countries as well. About 9% of the population lives on less than
$2/day in middle-income Malaysia. Surprisingly given the communitarian
rhetoric of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s poverty ranking is out of line with
its income level and HDI ranking. The U.S. has the highest rate of poverty
at 15.3% when measured by the UNDP’s higher HPI-2 standard for
developed countries. More than 17% of the population in the U.S. is
income-poor, with the poverty line set at 50% of the median adjusted
household disposable income.30 While GNP reached a historic high in the
United States in 1990, having grown over 25% in a decade, child poverty
increased by 21% to where one in five American children lived in
poverty.31 Almost 30% of the poor had no medical insurance in 1991, and
somewhere between five and ten million Americans experienced
homelessness in the late 1980s.
D. Infant Mortality, Life Expectancy and Education
Table 2.1 on infant mortality, life expectancy and education
demonstrates that wealth and war matter, with richer and less war-prone
Asian countries outperforming many African countries. Japan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore outperform the significantly wealthier U.S. in terms
of infant mortality and life expectancy.
Vietnam and China, which score poorly on civil and political rights,
do well on primary school education, reaching levels comparable to that in
the U.S. The Philippines and Indonesia, torn by domestic strife and
affected by the Asian financial crisis that increased poverty particularly in
30. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, Human Rights
and Human Development (2000), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/
hdr_2000_back1.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (also noting that more than one in five adults in the
U.S. is functionally illiterate).
31. John Gledhill, Liberalism, Socio-Economic Rights and the Politics of Identity: From Moral
Economy to Indigenous Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT 70, 72-73 (Richard Wilson
ed., 1997).
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rural areas, suffer from relatively high rates of children who do not receive
a primary school education. Thailand performs surprisingly poorly on this
measure, reflecting perhaps the impact of the Asian financial crisis.
As Table 3.1 shows, Asian nations vary in the amount they spend on
education, health and military as a percentage of GDP. On the whole,
Asian states spend more on education than health, usually considerably
more, with the exception of Japan. In contrast, France, the U.S. and Japan
spend more on health than education, reflecting higher medical costs but
also greater wealth. No OECD country spends less than 5% of GDP on
health, whereas most developing countries spend only 2-3%. Given
differences in the size of the economies, the actual amount spent varies
widely. The WHO estimates that $30-40 per person is the bare minimum
needed to provide basic health services. However, in 1997, the least
developed countries spent on average $6/person and low-income countries
$13, compared to $125 in upper-middle income countries and $1,356 in
high-income countries. Making matters even worse in poor countries, rural
residents and those in the bottom 20% of income usually receive a
disproportionately small share of the medical services.32
The U.S. spends the most on the military in absolute terms, though at
3.1% of GDP, it trails Singapore at a high 5.0%. Only Singapore spends
more on military than education and health combined, reflecting its security
concerns as a small city state surrounded by larger states in which ethnic
and religious tensions might spill over into Singapore. Japan has the
highest ratio of combined education and health to military spending at 9.5
to 1. France, Thailand, and the Philippines spend more than five times as
much on education and health as on the military, the U.S. more than three
times, South Korea more than two and half times, India twice as much, and
China slightly less than twice as much. Military expenditures may be
offset by arms sales. The U.S. claims 41% of the market in conventional
weapons sales, compared to 9% for France and 1.7% for China.33
E. Income Inequality and Wealth Distribution
While wealth undoubtedly affects the ability of governments to
provide education and health services to their citizens, how the government
chooses to spend its money and how wealth is distributed among the
members of society are also crucial factors in the quality of life of citizens,
32. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, Millennium
Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Poverty (2003), available at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
33.
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003,
available at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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especially the most vulnerable in society. As Table 4.1 shows, Asian
countries differ in terms of income distribution.34 However, they all are
more equitable than some of the worst offenders in Africa and Latin
America. Indonesia, a low-income country long associated with crony
capitalism under Suharto, fares surprisingly well. Meanwhile Malaysia, a
middle-income country often linked with Indonesia in the Asian-values
debates, fares rather poorly. The Philippines not only suffers from low
income but also extreme income inequality.
Among the high-income countries, Hong Kong, with its laissez faire
economic policies and colonial past, is the least equitable, though
Singapore and the U.S. are not far behind. Conversely, Japan once again
scores best, with South Korea and France also doing relatively well.
The numbers may be deceptive in that they do not indicate long-term
trends. China, once relatively egalitarian, is now rapidly becoming more
polarized.35 Similarly, Malaysia reduced the spread in the 1980s only to
see the gap widen rapidly in the 1990s.
F.

Quality of Governance

Asian governments that supported Asian values often unapologetically
defended their heavy-handed paternalistic ways by arguing that what
mattered was the bottom line: economic growth, good governance, clean
and effective civil servants. Table 5.1 shows that the Asia region on the
whole scores relatively high on measures of good governance, including
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
and control of corruption, with the exception of voice and accountability
where it ranked in the 50th percentile.
“Political stability and absence of violence” combines several
indicators that measure the likelihood that the government will be
overthrown or destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, including
terrorism. It is included as a good governance measure because political
instability and violence not only affect the ability of the ruling regime to
govern but deprive citizens of the ability to peacefully select and replace
those in power. “Government effectiveness” measures the provision of
34. Because the underlying household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected,
the distribution data are not strictly comparable across countries. The Gini index measures inequality
over the entire distribution of income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, and a
value of 100 perfect inequality. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS 2003, available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_126_1_1.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004).
35. See Carl Riskin et al., Introduction to The Retreat from Equality, in CHINA'S RETREAT FROM
EQUALITY 3 (2001) ("Seldom has the world witnessed so sharp and fast a rise in inequality as has
occurred in China.").
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public services, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence and
independence of civil servants, and the credibility of the government’s
policy commitments. Whereas government effectiveness focuses on the
institutional inputs required to implement policies effectively, “regulatory
quality” focuses on the policies themselves. It includes measures of
market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank
supervision, as well as perceptions of excessive regulation of foreign trade
and business development, reflecting a bias toward neo-liberal economic
policies. “Rule of law” measures the extent to which people have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, how fair and predictable the
rules are, and how well property rights are protected. The indicators
include perceptions of incidence of crime, the effectiveness and
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. “Control
of corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, the effects of corruption
on business, and “grand corruption” in the political arena.
Again, there is wide variation within the region, largely consistent
with levels of economic development, as indicated in Table 6.1. In the
high-income weight class, Singapore wins the gold in the four main
categories of good governance: government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. It also outperforms the
region in terms of voice and accountability and political stability, and the
others in the high-income category for the latter but not the former. The
U.S. takes the silver, with France and Hong Kong vying for the bronze.
Although Japan scored well on infant mortality, life expectancy, income
equality and other quality of life measures, its scores on government
effectiveness and regulatory quality leave something to be desired. While
it ranks relatively high in rule of law, it fares relatively poorly on the
corruption scale mainly because of grand political corruption.
While Taiwan outperformed the region on every measure, it
underperformed relative to others in its high-income group on every
measure. However, if classified as an upper-middle-income country, as in
the UNDP rankings, then it would do quite well relative to others in its
income class. South Korea consistently outperforms the regional average.
Moreover, relative to other countries in its upper-middle-income bracket, it
outperforms in the four main categories, although it lags behind in voice
and accountability and political stability.36 Malaysia outperforms the
regional average on the four main indicators of good governance and
political stability, though it underperforms on voice and accountability. It
outperforms others in its group on government effectiveness and slightly on
36. See Kaufmann et al., supra note 10, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
kkz2002/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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regulatory control, rule of law, and control of corruption, although it falls
far short on voice and accountability.
Thailand, a middle-income country according to UNDP standards but
classified as lower-middle by the World Bank, outperforms the region and
the average in the lower-middle income class by a wide margin on every
dimension. China outperforms lower-middle-income countries in political
stability, government effectiveness, and rule of law; it does slightly better
in control of corruption, and is about average in regulatory quality.
However, it scores much lower on voice and accountability. The
Philippines, also in the lower-middle-income category, scores high on
voice and accountability, low on political stability, outperforms the income
average on government effectiveness and regulatory quality, but lags
slightly behind on rule of law and corruption.
In the low-income category, India outperforms others in all
dimensions except political stability. Indonesia lags behind the regional
averages and other low-income countries on political stability, rule of law
and control of corruption, but outperforms others at its income level in
voice and accountability, government effectiveness and slightly in
regulatory quality. Vietnam lags behind the region in all categories except
political stability. However, it outperforms others in its income class in
political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of
corruption, though it lags far behind in voice and accountability.
G. Law and Order and Social Stability: Crime Rates, Drug Rates,
Suicides, Divorces and Young Mothers
Lee Kuan Yew and other Asian leaders have often been critical of the
high crime rates, rampant drug use and social disorder in economically
advanced Western liberal democracies. Rather, they stress family and
communitarian values, social stability and law and order. Tables 7.1 and
8.1 demonstrate that there are significant differences in crime rates and
other indicators of social order.
Crimes rates must be used with caution because of differences in the
way crimes are defined, the willingness of rape victims to come forward
and other factors that affect the data reported, wide fluctuations from year
to year, as well as differences in the level of economic development and
demographic factors such as the percentage of rural population and youths.
Notwithstanding such qualifications, the results are striking: Asian
countries, especially in the higher income brackets, tend to have much
lower crime rates relative to their level of economic development,
industrialization and urbanization. For instance, the total crime rates for
high-income countries France and the U.S. are twice to six times the rates
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in Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The much higher crime rates hold
across the board for property offenses such as theft and burglary, violent
crimes such murder (which are generally considered to suffer from fewer
problems in reporting and data collection) and drug offenses. The U.S.
suffers from particularly high levels of violent crime, especially rape.
South Korean crime rates are also two to six times lower than fellow upper
middle-income countries South Africa and Poland. The lower-income
countries such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Vietnam
have lower crime rates than the wealthier countries. Data collection is
particularly problematic in low-income countries, making comparisons
more difficult. However, it would appear that crime and social disorder is a
greater problem in India, the Philippines and Indonesia than in China,
Vietnam and Thailand. Thailand, however, which has low overall crime
rates, has a surprisingly high murder rate.
Countries vary widely in how they deal with criminals. The U.S. also
has the dubious distinction of the highest rate of incarceration in the world,
as well as some of the most severe punishments. In contrast, France and
Japan have low rates of incarceration relative to their crime rates, and tend
to place more emphasis on noncustodial sanctions and in Japan’s case on
rehabilitation. In general, however, Asian states with the exception of
Japan rely on heavy punishments.
Other indicators of social order such as suicide, divorce and young
mother rates produce more mixed results, less clearly tied to levels of
wealth, as indicated in Table 8.1. Suicide rates are very high in Japan,
followed by France, and then a cluster of countries including South Korea,
China, and Hong Kong, followed by the U.S. and India. Thailand and the
Philippines, perhaps because of religious influences, have very low rates.
Suicide rates are frequently higher among some segments of the population
than others. The rate of suicide among women in China, particularly rural
women, is much higher than the overall national rate.
The U.S. has a much higher divorce rate than other countries. The
next country, South Korea, with a surprisingly high rate, is still only half of
that of the U.S. Singapore’s divorce rate is relatively low.
The birth rates to young mothers vary widely, with Indonesia, India
and the Philippines leading the pack, followed by the U.S. and Vietnam. In
contrast, there are very few such births in France and the East Asian
countries Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea or China.
H. Provisional Summary
•

There is a wide variation within Asia in terms of human rights
performance and other measures of quality of life.
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Asian countries, especially East Asian countries, tend to do poorly on
civil and political rights relative to others in their income group.
Moreover, even the most democratic regimes in the region score
somewhat lower than the more liberal U.S. and France.
However, Asian countries tend to do much better, both relative to
civil and political rights and also to other countries in their income
group, on economic rights and other quality of life indicators such as
education, infant mortality, life expectancy, law and order and social
stability.
Asian governments also tend to outperform other countries in their
income group on good governance measures.
Each country does better in some respects than others. By selecting
particular measures, one can present either a positive or negative
image of any country.
Rampant rights violations, grinding poverty, appalling misery and
suffering, and daily assaults to human dignity continue to exist in all
countries. Each and every country could do better, and is more and
legally obligated to do better, in countless ways.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR PERFORMANCE: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE MOST COMMON EXPLANATORY FACTORS

What accounts for the difference in rights performance in the Asian
region? Quantitative studies have shown that the protection of rights is
associated with, among other things, and in roughly descending order of
importance: economic development, with a higher level of development
associated with better protection of rights; international or civil wars, with
war leading to more violations of rights; political regime type, with
democracies protecting rights better than authoritarian or military regimes;
regional effects, with Northern Europe and North America outperforming
other regions, and with “region” often serving as a proxy for religion and
culture; population size, with larger populations leading to higher rates of
violation; and colonial history, with British colonialism linked to better
rights protection.37 Interestingly, ratification of treaties does not translate
into better protection for human rights, and may even have a negative

37. See generally, Steven Poe et al., supra note 15; Linda C. Keith, Constitutional Provisions for
Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are They More than Mere "Window Dressing," 55(1) POL. RES.
Q. 111, 119-23 (2002). As discussed below, the relative importance of the factors varies depending on
the right in question. In particular, wealth is less important with respect to personal integrity rights than
other rights.
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effect, at least in the short term.38 In this section, I examine rights
performance in Asian in light of these factors.
A. Political Stability: War, Civil Strife, Ethnic Unrest and Terrorism
There are no international wars involving the Asian countries in this
study at present. However, in the past two decades, there have been
skirmishes in the Korean peninsula, an invasion by Vietnam of Cambodia,
border conflicts between Vietnam and China, skirmishes in the Taiwan
straits, several conflicts between India and its neighbors, including Pakistan
and China, and violence in Indonesia and East Timor. Meanwhile, the U.S.
has been involved in some forty military actions, including wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, regime-changing invasions in Grenada, Panama
and Haiti, military assistance to rebel groups in Angola, El Salvador and
Nicaragua, and missile attacks on Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and Sudan.39
In the near future, North Korea, having declared its intention to pursue
the development of nuclear weapons, remains an area of concern. The
Taiwan independence issue could be explosive. Chen Shuibian’s playing
of the referendum card to boost his flagging chances for reelection and his
commitment to a constitutional overhaul have increased tensions
considerably. In addition, there continue to be a number of border disputes
in the region. The signing of a multiparty agreement regarding the Spratly
Islands in 2000 has eased tensions, although recent moves by China to
develop natural gas in the South China Seas and by Vietnam to renovate an
airport on the Islands and run tours for tourists have once again raised

38. A study of 178 countries from 1976 to 1993 found that signing the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or even the Optional Protocol allowing individuals to raise
complaints had no impact on state's actual behavior after controlling for other factors known to affect
human rights implementation. Overall human rights protection among member states was no better
than among non-member states, all else being equal. Linda C. Keith, The United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J.
PEACE RES. 95, 106 (1999). Another study examining compliance with respect to torture, genocide, fair
trials, civil liberties, and women's political equality in 166 countries found similar results. Although
countries that ratify human rights treaties usually have somewhat better compliance ratings than
countries that do not (without controlling for other factors), noncompliance is rampant. Moreover,
countries with the worst human rights records sometimes have higher ratification rates than countries
with better human rights records. In some cases, treaty ratification is associated with worse human
rights ratings, leading the author to conclude that the "relatively costless step of treaty ratification may
thereby offset pressure for costly changes in policies." Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941, 1978 (2002). Nevertheless, a country's ratification of a
human rights treaty generally strengthens the hand of domestic and international rights advocates and
may therefore contribute to norm change over time. Thus in the long term, the human rights situation
may improve.
39. Zoltan Grossman, From Wounded Knee to Haita: A Century of U.S. Military Interventions, at
http://www.uwec.edu/grossmzc/interventions.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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concerns. The strengthening of ASEAN may also help defuse conflict in
the region as member states become more economically interdependent.
The main sources of instability in the region are domestic. Nepal and
the Philippines continue to battle rebel insurgents. Indonesia and East
Timor are struggling to maintain stability in the wake of East Timor’s
declaration of independence and the downfall of Suharto. The rise of
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia have further challenged
the newly formed democratic regime’s ability to maintain social order.
India remains one of the least stable countries in the region, in part
because of potential international conflicts with its neighbors but also
because of domestic threats arising from ethnic strife, terrorism and general
discontent associated with poverty and an ineffectual government.
China remains relatively stable, although the potential for instability
should not be dismissed lightly. Sources of instability include terrorist
threats by radical groups in Xinjiang as well as a broader group of
Xinjiangese and Tibetans who desire independence or at least greater
autonomy. Frequent massive demonstrations by disgruntled farmers, laidoff urban workers and pensioners who are unable to obtain their retirement
benefits from moribund state-owned enterprises or poorly funded welfare
programs also have the government on edge. In addition, China’s
impressive economic run over the last twenty-five years is threatened by a
high percentage of bad loans that could undermine the banking system.
Judging from the harshness of the crackdown, the ruling regime also
perceives advocates of democracy, certain religious groups such as Falun
Gong and other social groups as potentially destabilizing.
The U.S. received a relatively poor political stability rating in the
World Bank 2002 study, ranking just higher than China and lower than
South Korea. The lower ranking reflects the rise of terrorism and the
possibility of retaliation for the aggressive U.S. military policies in
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the world.
South Korea, which has experienced violent clashes with students
and workers in the past, continues to face the threat of conflict with North
Korea. As a result, its political stability rating is the same as that of
Vietnam and lower than the regional average and the average for its income
class. Vietnam’s political stability rating appears to reflect the concern that
the authoritarian socialist system is simply not sustainable, and yet the
regime may not be able to manage political transition to a more stable form
of government.
Malaysia has been relatively stable. However, the threat of terrorism
and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, as well as concerns about the
transition of power now that Mahathir has stepped down, have given rise to
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worries about political stability. Nevertheless, it remains relatively stable,
as does Thailand. While Thailand has a history of coups, and the military
remains strong, it has emerged as one of the more stable democracies in the
region. Although terrorists have been captured in Thailand, terrorist
activities are primarily oriented toward other states. The authorities have
clashed with Islamic separatist in southern provinces, however, resulting in
more than 100 deaths and the imposition of martial law in the region.
Hong Kong remains stable, despite recent mass demonstrations of
several hundreds of thousands to protest the ineffectual rule of Tung Cheehwa, an economic recession, proposed national security legislation required
under the Basic Law, and limited political reforms. The pace of
democratization in Hong Kong and China remains an issue, and there will
inevitably be tensions between Beijing and Hong Kong under the novel one
country, two systems approach. Nevertheless, there is little chance of
political instability given Hong Kong’s politically cautious, businessminded citizenry and the fundamental reality that Hong Kong is part of the
PRC.
Japan, France and Singapore all rank high on political stability.
However, Japan’s sending of soldiers to Iraq has created tensions at home,
with many citizens concerned that Japan’s increasing presence in U.N.
peacekeeping and nation-building operations runs afoul of constitutional
limits on the military.
More generally, the war on terrorism has resulted in threats to civil
liberties in all countries. In addition to hurriedly passing a series of antiterrorist laws, the U.S. has pressured other countries in Asia to beef up their
national security laws, often dangling the bait of bilateral trade benefits as
an inducement. Ironically, prior to 9-11, the U.S. State Department and
Western rights organizations routinely criticized Asian countries for
cracking down on dissidents, insurgents, terrorists, and others who threaten
social order on the ground that the life of the nation was not at stake as
literally required under Article 4 of the ICCPR to justify the derogation of
civil and political rights. Yet surely the threats faced by many Asian
countries have been and continue to be more serious than the threats
currently faced by the U.S. Isolated acts of terrorism, deplorable as they
may be, are not likely to bring the world’s mightiest military power to its
knees. In any event, rights advocates worry that U.S. pressure will set the
clock back in societies that have fought to eliminate or restrict the use of
national security laws to harass political opponents.
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B. Economic Development
Some Asian governments have cited their economic record in
defending the need to rule with a strong hand. On the whole the Asian
region has done extremely well in achieving economic growth, particularly
compared to other regions. However, the level of development varies
widely in Asia.
The U.S. leads the pack with GDP/capita (PPP) of U.S. $34,320, as
indicated in Table 9.1. Also in the high-income category are Japan, Hong
Kong, France, and Singapore in the $22,000 to $25,000 range. South
Korea and Taiwan are in the upper-middle category, with PPP levels at
slightly less than half of the U.S. and about two-thirds that of the highincome Asian countries. Malaysia and Thailand are in the middle, with
PPP levels about one-fifth to one-fourth that of the U.S., and one-third that
of rich Asian countries. China and the Philippines are in the lower-middle
group, with one-eighth of the per capita wealth of the U.S. and one-sixth
that of rich Asian countries. Indonesia, India and Vietnam fall into the
low-income category.
As the scatterplots in Figure 4.1 graphically portray, level of
development is clearly related to better protection of human rights. The
correlations in Table 10.1 demonstrate that the relationship between wealth
and human development40 and good governance is extremely strong.41 The
relationship for voice and accountability is also strong, and statistically
significant. Although statistically significant, the relationship between
personal integrity rights globally and GDP is weaker. This is due to police
violence and other acts classified as torture even in rich countries, and
because rich countries also react to war, terrorism and political stability by
limiting civil and political rights and detaining suspects in ways that are
considered arbitrary detention under international human rights standards.42
40. There is also a strong relationship between wealth and women's rights as measured by the
UNDP's Gender Development Index (GDI) index (r=.93). The GDI index is highly correlated with the
HDI index (r=.999). The GDI is a composite indicator that measures the average achievement of a
population in the same dimensions as the HDI while adjusting for gender inequalities in the level of
achievement in the three basic aspects of human development. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
UNDP Gender-related Development Index (2003 statistics), available at http://www.undp.org/
hdr2003/indicator/indic_196_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). It uses the same variables as the
HDI, disaggregated by gender. Given the high correlation, the scatterplot for GDI is virtually identical
to that for HDI. Even the regional correlations differ only slightly as indicated in Table 10.1.
41. Three variables (Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption) are so
highly correlated (Pearson r > .91) that they appear to measure the same thing. Reliability analysis
confirms this (alpha = .97), and so the variables have been standardized and combined into a single
good governance scale.
42. Keith, supra note 37, at 119 (citing eight studies and concluding that "empirical evidence has
consistently shown that higher levels of economic development reduce political repression," but finding
that the factors affecting personal integrity were in order of importance a large population, civil war, a
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Wealth then explains the brunt of variation in human rights
performance around the world,43 strongly supporting the arguments calling
for greater emphasis on the right to development and more assistance from
wealthy western liberal democracies. To be sure, the high correlations do
not indicate the direction of causality. Wealth may cause better rights
performance, or better protection of rights may lead to more wealth.
Moreover, wealth is not the only factor or the most determinative for all
rights in all cases. Some countries in each income group beat expectations
while others fall far short. Of 174 countries, 97 scored higher on HDI, the
indicator of social and economic rights, than their GDP ranking, while 69
scored lower.44
There are also strong regional differences that weaken the correlation
between wealth and civil and political rights. East Asian states with a
Confucian heritage and Middle East states with an Islamic tradition are less
supportive of civil and political rights, even if wealthy. Latin American
states, with a history of corporatism, patron-client relationships, corruption
and large income gaps, and African countries, with traditions of
collectivism, strong ethnic affinities and more recently dysfunctional and
corrupt leadership, are also less supportive of civil and political rights.
Cultural factors then play a role in some contexts and with respect to
some rights.45 To be sure, cultural traits are also closely correlated with
change in democracy from lowest to highest level, international war, provisions for fair trials, GDP, and
provisions for public trials). See also Christian Davenport, "Constitutional Promises" and Repressive
Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties are
Suppressed, 58(3) J. POL. 627, 644-45 (1996) (impact of economic development minimal in his study
and three others); Conway Henderson, Conditions Affecting Use of Political Repression, 35 J.
CONFLICT RES. 120, 132-34 (1991) (democracy, inequality, and economic growth were statistically
significant predictors of political repression, though level of economic development was not).
Economic growth might be an important indicator for personal integrity rights because people are less
likely to take to the streets when their material standards are improving. In contrast, economic
downturns, particularly at low levels of development, frequently result in regime change. Adam
Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 (2) WORLD POL. 155, 169
(1997). While there is general agreement that domestic conflict is a greater threat to personal integrity
rights than interstate conflicts, some studies have found that interstate conflict is a significant factor
while others have found that interstate conflict is not a significant factor. See, e.g., M. Rodwan
Abouharb and David L. Cingranelli, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Government Respect for
Human Rights 1982-2001, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science
Association, Chicago, Sept. 2, 2004, available at http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2004).
43. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 32. Although Figure 4.1 presents simple
correlations without controlling for other factors, many of the studies cited in note 15 do control for
other factors, and still find a strong, statistically significant relationship between wealth and rights
performance.
44. See id.
45. Notwithstanding the strong correlation between wealth and good governance, at least one
study has found that cultural values are more predictive of rule of law and good governance than GDP.
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wealth, as well as such demographic factors as age, education, rural-urban
ratios, and occupation.46 Moreover, the relationship between wealth and
human rights performance in Asia and the Middle East is consistently
strong except with respect to civil and political rights. This supports the
view that there is a culturally-based antipathy to liberal values that explains
the variance. In contrast, the relationship between wealth and all types of
rights is consistently weak in Latin America and Africa, suggesting that the
culprit is corrupt and dysfunctional governments that serve the rich, if they
serve anyone, at the expense of the general populace.
Finally, it bears noting that rights performance of any country may
deteriorate rapidly because of war, economic stagnation, natural disasters
or problems like HIV/AIDS, though again, poor countries are likely to
suffer disproportionately.
Whereas most studies use GDP as the independent variable, some
studies have found that economic growth rates are also important to the
protection of rights. Again, there is significant variation in terms of longterm growth rates in the region. Only six countries—Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and China—experienced sustained growth
of over 5% for the period from 1965 until 1995.47 Thailand, Malaysia and
Indonesia grew more slowly, at around 3.5% per year. Seven countries,
including North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, the
Philippines and Myanmar, averaged less than 2% growth. Growth rates in
Licht et al., supra note 7. The study found that countries that emphasized autonomy and egalitarianism
had higher levels of rule of law, accountability, and less corruption, whereas countries that emphasized
embeddedness and hierarchy had a lower level of rule of law, accountability, and worse corruption. In
short, English-speaking and Western Europe scored significantly higher than other regions. The authors
suggest that cultural orientation in East Asia may make it more difficult to implement rule of law,
restrict corruption, and increase accountability or that "good governance" in Asia may differ in some
respects from "good governance" in liberal democratic Western countries.
Good governance in Asian countries no doubt differs in significant respects from good governance
in rich, liberal, democratic Western countries once one examines in more detail the broad variables of
rule of law, accountability, and corruption. Nevertheless, Asian states have outperformed other regions
in terms of rule of law on the same World Bank good governance scales used by the Licht et al., supra
note 7, suggesting that culture may not be as important at least in Asia as the authors suggest..
46. See HOFSTEDE, supra note 14, at 83-84, 161-62, 251 (wealth biggest factor with respect to
individualism versus collectivism, the power distance index, which measures the extent to which less
powerful members of society accept that power is distributed unequally, and uncertainty avoidance,
which measures the extent to which people are comfortable in unstructured situations); RONALD
INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES 74-77 (1997) (GNP/capita strongly correlated with both wellbeing versus
survival, and secular-rational versus traditional authority); Smith et al., supra note 8, at 200 (GDP
strongly correlated with autonomy versus conservatism, and egalitarianism versus hierarchy); Geert
Hofstede & Michael H. Bond, The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth,
16 ORG. DYNAMICS 4, 16 (Spring 1988) (relating Confucian work dynamism to economic growth).
47. Henry S. Rowen, The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia, in BEHIND
EAST ASIAN GROWTH 2 (Henry S. Rowen ed., 1998).
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Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam increased during the 1980s and
1990s up until the financial crisis.
Several points bear noting. First, the period of rapid growth generally
occurred under an authoritarian regime. However, not all of the
authoritarian regimes in the region have succeeded in achieving high
growth rates (e.g., Myanmar, North Korea), nor have all the democracies
(e.g., the Philippines, India). Regime type is not as important as the
stability of the regime and variations within regimes.48 In particular,
regimes that are market-oriented, dominated by technocrats, and relatively
free from corruption are more likely to be successful.
Second, of the Asian countries that have experienced sustained
growth, most have enjoyed legal systems that comply with the standards of
rule of law, at least in their handling of commercial matters. Although the
political regimes may not have been democratic and the legal system may
not have provided much protection for civil and political rights in some
cases, the Asian countries that experienced economic growth generally
scored high with respect to the legal protection of economic interests. A
survey of economic freedoms in 102 countries between 1993 and 1995
found that seven of the top twenty countries were in Asia.49 Economic
freedoms include protection of the value of money, free exchange of
property, a fair judiciary, few trade restrictions, labor market freedoms, and
freedom from economic coercion by political opponents. With the possible
exception of China, the legal systems of the six countries that have
achieved highest economic growth measure up favorably in terms of
economic freedoms and rule of law, particularly with respect to commercial
matters. In contrast, the legal systems of the lowest performing countries
are among the weakest in the region. The data for Asian countries is
consistent with the general evidence from other countries that demonstrates
that rule of law is necessary if not sufficient in most cases for sustained
economic development.50
Third, all else being equal, authoritarian regimes tend to outperform
democratic regimes at relatively low levels of economic development.51

48. See Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 42, at 178-79 (discussing the factors that contribute to
the stability of regimes).
49. Rowen, supra note 47, at 6-7.
50. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 458-62 (2002)
(suggesting that rule of law is necessary for sustained economic development).
51. See Robert J. Barro, Democracy: A Recipe for Growth?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 67, 89-98 (Muhammad G. Quibria & J. Malcolm Dowling
eds., 1996) (analyzing the effects of economic development on democracy, and concluding that
"countries at low levels of economic development typically do not sustain democracy").
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Thus, promoting democracy in very poor countries may be putting the cart
before the horse.
Fourth, some Asian countries, including China, may not yet have
reached the level of development that makes it likely that there will be a
transition to democracy, and even if there were, that democracy would be
sustainable.52 While democracy proponents often claim that authoritarian
regimes are particularly vulnerable to economic downturns, so are
democracies, at least at relatively low levels of growth.53
Fifth, when the conditions for a durable or stable democracy are not
present, the transition to democracy often impedes economic development,
at least in the short term.
Sixth, economic development is not sufficient for political reform and
the emergence of democracy. Countries may develop economically and
not become liberal democracies, at least for a considerable period. Hong
Kong and Singapore are good examples.
Seventh, higher levels of prosperity and economic development are
likely to lead to a growing demand for democracy—Taiwan, South Korea,
Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong are good examples. Whether or not
economic development is the cause of democratization, in the long term,
economically advanced countries are likely to be, and to remain,
democracies.
Finally, as discussed in the next section, democratization does not
necessarily lead to an improvement in human rights.
As for the relation of growth to rights rather than to democracy, high
growth rates may in the long term lead to better protection of rights as a
society becomes wealthier, and may in the short term diminish popular
discontent and opposition to government policies, thus reducing the need to
suppress political dissent or take harsh actions to curb social protests. But
higher growth rates are also consistent with rising inequality and political
oppression, as the experiences of several Asian countries demonstrate. As
indicated in Table 11.1, China and Vietnam have enjoyed the highest
growth rates in recent years, explaining to some extent the legitimacy of the
authoritarian governments and the relative political stability despite severe
restrictions on civil and political rights. Similarly, Taiwan, Singapore,
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Malaysia enjoyed high growth rates during
their authoritarian years, although growth rates have tapered off in recent
years as the size of the economy has grown and because of other factors,
such as the effect of the Asian financial crisis. India’s growth rate has been
52. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 521-22 (comparing views on whether China has reached
the minimum level of development required to sustain democracy).
53. Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 42, at 177-78.
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relatively high, though only half of that of China. Asia’s other developing
democracy, the Philippines, has struggled economically, posting some of
the lowest rates in the region.
In addition to levels of development and growth rates, researchers
have studied the effect of FDI and foreign assistance on human rights.
Unfortunately, such studies have been inconclusive.54 Taking a look at the
region, China clearly receives the most FDI, and indeed was the leading
destination in the world for FDI in 2002. In terms of FDI as a percentage
of GDP however, the countries ranked as follows in 2001: Hong Kong
14.1, Singapore 10.1, Vietnam 4.0, France 4.0, China 3.8, Thailand 3.3,
U.S. 1.3, South Korea 0.8, India 0.7, Malaysia 0.6, and Indonesia 2.4.55
Consistent with the general studies, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions from these figures for the Asian region. In most cases, foreign
businesses pursue their own economic interests. While there may be some
diffusion of norms, in some cases the better-off working in foreign
enterprises tend to be conservative defenders of the status quo.56
Moreover, foreign investors themselves have very different records on
labor rights issues. In China, large multinational companies from the U.S.,
Europe and Japan provide similar treatment to employees as in their own
country. However, investors from other countries in the region often
engage in abusive practices.57
While FDI may stimulate growth and provide much needed jobs, it
can also contribute to financial crisis. The Asian financial crisis clearly
resulted in lower living standards in many Asian countries. In Thailand,
poverty levels jumped from eight percent in 1996 to twenty percent in 1998
as a result of the financial crisis, eliminating much of the progress made in
last twenty years. Some 800,000 school children and college students were
forced to drop out of school; social problems such as alcoholism,
depression and suicide increased; immigrants were no longer welcome; and
trafficking in children and prostitution increased.58 Fortunately, Thailand

54. Mosley and Uno, supra note 4.
55. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, Human Development Indicators (2003), available at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_151_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
56. PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 530.
57. See generally ANITA CHAN, CHINA'S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE
IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (2001) (conducting a review on the various types of labor-rights abuses
suffered by Chinese workers).
58. KENNETH CHRISTIE & DENNY ROY, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA 166
(Peter Van Ness ed., 2001).
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has now recovered from the financial crisis, and regained or even improved
on pre-crisis levels for human development and other rights.59
Although studies have reached different conclusions about the impact
of foreign aid on human rights, the impact seems to be limited in most
cases.60 What is abundantly clear from such studies is that aid is more
often determined by the strategic, commercial and political concerns of the
donor, rather than given out of pure altruism. At minimum, it is safe to say
that the human rights record of the recipient is rarely the determining
factor, and that there is a significant gap between a rhetorical commitment
to democracy and human rights and the deliverance of aid and the pursuit
of other goals that undermine democracy and human rights.61 Looking at
the amount of ODA received (U.S. millions) and the rate per capita in the
region, India clearly leads in the total amount of aid received, although
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines have higher rates per capita: India
1705/1.7; Indonesia 1500/7.0, China 1460/1.1, Vietnam 1439/18.1, the
Philippines 577/7.5, Thailand 281/4.6, Malaysia 27/1.1, Hong Kong
3.6/0.2; Singapore 1.0/0.5. Again, no straightforward conclusions seem to
flow from these numbers, although the relatively poor civil and political
rights records of Vietnam, China and Indonesia suggest that aid alone is not
an effective lever for changing government policies in that area.
C. Political Regime: Democracy, Authoritarianism and Their Mixed
Offspring
Many studies using a variety of methods and definitions find that
democracy reduces human rights violations.62 However, the studies tend to
assume a linear relationship: marginal improvement in democratization
leads to a similar improvement in protection of human rights. Yet many
qualitative studies have found that democratization has not led to better
protection of human rights in the countries studied.63 Despite the much59. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (discussing Thailand's economic recovery and its current
government's promotion of human rights).
60. Patrick M. Regan, U.S. Economic Aid and Political Repression: An Empirical Evaluation of
U.S. Foreign Policy, 48 POL. RES. Q. 613, 625 (1995).
61. See Bethany Barratt, Aiding Whom? Competing Explanations of Middle-Power Foreign Aid
Decisions, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association,
Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, supra note 6, at 24, 26 (finding no relationship between
British and Canadian foreign aid and the human rights record of recipients); see also Steven C. Poe,
Human Rights and US Foreign Aid: A Review of Quantitative Studies and Suggestions for Future
Research, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 499, 499-512 (1990) (summarizing seven studies that focus on human
rights and foreign assistance, and noting that five of these studies "flow against the hypothesis that
human rights considerations affect the foreign aid decisionmaking process").
62. See generally Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 14; Landman, supra note 19.
63. Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 14.
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vaunted third wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, regimes that
combined meaningful democratic elections with authoritarian features
outnumbered liberal democracies in developing countries during the
1990s.64
A number of quantitative studies support the disconcerting results of
the qualitative studies by showing that the third wave has not led to a
decrease in political repression, with some studies showing that political
terror and violations of personal integrity rights actually increased in the
1980s.65 Other studies have found that there are non-linear effects to
democratization: transitional or illiberal democracies increase repressive
action. Fein described this phenomenon as “more murder in the middle” –
as political space opens, the ruling regime is subject to greater threats to its
power and so resorts to violence.66 More recent studies have also
concluded that the level of democracy matters: below a certain level
democratic regimes oppress as much as non-democratic regimes.67
Democracy consists of different elements or dimensions, and thus
most studies use a composite index. The Polity IV measure increasingly
favored by researchers is a 21-point scale made up of five components:
competitiveness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of participation,
executive constraints, openness of executive recruitment and regulation of
participation. Other composite measures of democracy include civil
64. Levitsky & Way, supra note 3.
65. McCann & Gibney, supra note 19, at 23-25; see also Reilly, supra note 6 (noting that over the
period from 1976-1996, the number of countries with the best score actually decreased, countries with
the worst score increased, while the mean remained about the same); Landman supra note 19 (noting an
increase in violations of personal integrity and torture between 1985 and 1993).
66. Helen Fein, More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the
World, 1987, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 170, 174, 184 (1995).
67. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and
Human Rights, paper presented at the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association,
Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, supra note 6, at 15. See also Davenport & Armstrong, supra
note 14 (studying the influence of democracy on human rights violations, and suggesting that
"authorities do not perceive any change in the costs and benefits of repression until the highest levels of
democracy have been achieved"); Keith, supra note 37, at 129 (democracy has only minor impact on
personal integrity rights, although transition from lowest level to highest level produces a more
substantial impact). Another study found that democracy leads to improvement in human rights
performance within the first year of holding elections, but then leads to increased repression in
following years. See S.C. Zanger, A Global Analysis of the Effect of Regime Changes on Life Integrity
Violations, 1977-93, 37 (2) J. PEACE RES. 213, 216-18, 229 (2000). Contrastingly, while a regime
change from democracy to authoritarianism brings repression in its first year, it results in a decrease in
repression in subsequent years. Moreover, the study distinguished between democracies, authoritarian
regimes, and mixed regimes – i.e., those regimes that score in the middle of the Polity III index, as most
new democracies are likely to do. Transitions from an authoritarian regime to a mixed regime lead to
more repression in the year of change, a decrease in the first year, and then an increase in the second
year. In sum, the results support the argument that human rights improvements are consistently
obtained only in full democracies. Id.
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liberties, freedom of press, minority protection, and so on. Which elements
matter the most for the protection of human rights?68 Is there a sequencing
effect that would recommend increasing political participation before
increasing constraints on the executive, or vice versa? de Mesquita et al.
found that political participation and limits on executive authority are more
significant than other aspects, but that there is no human rights benefit at all
until the very highest levels of political participation and executive
constraints are achieved. However, these levels require moderate progress
on each of the other subdimensions. In short, “there is no significant
increase in human rights with an incremental increase in the level of
democracy until we reach the point where executive constraints are greatest
and where multiple parties compete regularly in elections and there has
been at least one peaceful exchange of power between the parties. . . . Put
more starkly, human rights progress only reliably appears toward the end of
the democratization process.”69
Policymakers are again faced with morally ambiguous results.
Democracy appears to be related to both economic growth and human
rights, but the human rights benefits of democracy may occur only once
democracy is consolidated. Moreover, all else being equal, authoritarian
regimes tend to outperform democratic regimes at relatively low levels of
economic development, while democracies are unstable at low levels of
development and susceptible to collapse when economic performance
suffers.70 This supports the views of several Asian leaders who argue that
economic growth should come before democratic reforms.71 On the other
hand, advocates of a growth-first approach may be troubled by studies
showing that IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs lead to
more repression, at least in the short term, although the long-term results
are variable.72 At minimum, policymakers should strive to avoid
68. As noted in de Mesquita et al., supra note 67, at 5-6, one of the disadvantages of using
composite measures of democracy is that it is not clear how democracy promotes human rights. The
factors measured by studies of democracy are only loosely tied to theories about why democracy
protects human rights.
69. Id at 15.
70. Barro, supra note 51, at 89, 98; Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 42, at 177-78.
71. Democracy advocates may also be concerned by studies indicating that a shift to democratic
elections has led to greater spending on primary education in some countries at the expense of
secondary and tertiary education. See David Stasavage, Democracy and Education Spending (July
2004), at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/stasavag/education-AJPSfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
72. M. Rodwan Abouharb & David L. Cingranelli, Money Talks? The Impact of World Bank
Structural Adjustment Lending on Human Rights, 1981-2000, paper presented at the annual meeting of
The American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Aug. 28-31, 2003, at APSA, supra note 6, at
13-14. This study of 161 countries found that after controlling for existing circumstances within a
country, there was an improvement in personal integrity rights during the year the loan was received,
but then deterioration in the following two years once structural adjustment conditions were imposed.
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sacrificing the short-term interests of the poorest members of society at the
altar of long-term growth by adopting relief measures to protect the most
vulnerable.
The experiences of Asian countries with democratization are largely
consistent with the findings of these multiple-country studies. In
Indonesia, there have been numerous human rights violations after the fall
of Suharto, most notably with respect to ethnic violence, the tragedy in East
Timor, and the violence that marred the 1999 elections.73
Similarly, Amnesty International reported in 1993 that the human
rights situation had not substantially improved under the democratic regime
in South Korea.74 Even the former rights activist and President Kim Dae
Jung was unwilling or unable to do away with the strict National Security
Law despite his campaign promises. To be sure, the number of persons
arrested for violating the National Security Law has decreased in recent
years. Nevertheless, almost 80 people were arrested in the first year of the
presidency of former human rights lawyer Roh Moo-hyun. Moreover,
while the government is more hesitant to invoke national security concerns
to justify rights violations, in practice law enforcement agencies continue to
emphasize confession and make use of “special interrogation rooms”
maintained in the prosecutors’ office.75
Although Cambodia held elections in 1993 and 1998, the period was
marked by battles between government armed forces and the Khmer
Rouge, resulting in continued human rights violations including murder,
rape, hostage-taking, and secret detention.76 The government offered
amnesty to key leaders and supporters of the Khmer Rouge, much to the
dismay of many rights advocates. Nevertheless, stability remained an issue
with a preemptive coup by Hun Sen in 1997 in which more than fifty
people were killed, many of them shot in the back of the head after arrest.77
Id. at 14. This suggests that governments improve their performance to impress the World Bank and
secure loans, but that the austerity measures associated with structural adjustment policies lead to
violations of rights thereafter. See also Linda C. Keith & Steven C. Poe, The United States, the IMF,
and Human Rights: A Policy-Relevant Approach, in THE UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
LOOKING INWARD AND OUTWARD 281-82 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000) (weak short term increase in
level of repression following receipt of IMF loan); Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 42 (finding that
there was a significant increase in the probability of torture, extra-judicial killing, and political
disappearances in the three years following a Structural Adjustment Agreement).
73. Juwana, supra note 23.
74. AMNESTY
INT'L,
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL
REPORT
1993,
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar93/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
75. Chaihark Hahm, Human Rights in Korea, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14.
76. One can, of course, challenge whether Cambodia or Singapore or Malaysia are democracies in
the relevant sense.
77. David Chandler, Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?, 14 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 67, 79
(2000).
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In the Philippines, democracy has not resolved pressing
socioeconomic problems. Under Ramos, the percentage living in poverty
was reduced, but the gap between rich and poor grew.78 There have also
been numerous rights violations, including disappearances, extrajudicial
killings, arbitrary arrests, and prolonged detention, as the government
continues to struggle against insurgents.79 Consistent with popular views in
other countries threatened by terrorism and insurgents, most Filipino
citizens apparently do not consider the government’s tough treatment of
terrorists as human rights violations. Preoccupied with fighting terrorists,
the government has been too weak to deal with corruption and violence,
and democracy has been driven by cronyism, family networks in the
countryside, and personalities. Meanwhile, in Burma, a weak democratic
government led to discontent and provided an incentive for military
intervention in politics.80
Moreover, a large number of citizens in Taiwan and South Korea
continue to harbor serious doubts about democracy. Taiwan and South
Korea have generally been considered success stories in that they have
achieved relatively mature democracies, although the violence and
allegations of impropriety in the recent presidential election in Taiwan have
tarnished Taiwan’s image. With a 2.0 ranking on Freedom House’s
political rights and civil liberties scale, they are considered to be “liberal
democracies,” despite shortcomings in rule of law and restraints on
executive power.81 Nevertheless, “support for democracy lags well behind
the levels detected in other emerging and established democracies. And on
some dimensions of belief, the two publics exhibit a residual preference for
authoritarian or nondemocratic principles, akin to the portrait of traditional
or ‘Asian values.’”82 Global studies suggest that democracy becomes
stable when 70% of the populace insists on democracy as the best form of
government.83 However, only slightly more than half of citizens in South
Korea and Taiwan believe that democracy is the best form of government,
while 30% of Koreans and 12% of Taiwanese maintain that an
78. CHRISTIE & ROY, supra note 58, at 187.
79. Id. at 188, 191-92.
80. Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity and Democracy: A Theoretical Argument with a Burmese
Case Study and a Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, paper presented at the annual meeting of The
American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (arguing that modernization theories were
right to suggest that trying to build democracy before building the state is likely to backfire).
82.
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2003: SURVEY METHODOLOGY, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
82. Yun-han Chu et al., Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 122, 124
(2001).
83. Id.
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authoritarian government is sometimes preferable. Support for democracy
declined in South Korea after the financial crisis and the scandals in the
Kim Young Sam presidency, including one involving his son. Also
consistent with the Asia-values platform, some 65% of Koreans claim
economic development is more important than democracy, while only one
out of seven choose democracy.84
Numerous polls throughout the region show similar majoritarian
support for economic development and social stability over democracy and
civil and political rights.85 This is perhaps not surprising given that
between 60% and 84% of Indonesians, Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese and
Chinese identify economic difficulties as their number one concern, with
37% of Indonesians, 44% of Indians, 57% of Filipinos, 31% of Vietnamese
and 18% of Chinese claiming difficulties in affording adequate food.86
In other parts of the developing world, large majorities also are willing
to trade off democracy for economic growth. More than twice as many
Latin Americans would choose development over democracy, while 50%
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they would not mind
having a non-democratic government if it could solve economic
problems.87
84. Id.
85. See Susan Sim, Human Rights: Bridging the Gulf, STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 21, 1995, at 32. A
survey of academics, think tank experts, officials, businesspeople, journalists, and religious and cultural
leaders found significant differences between Asians and Americans. The former chose an orderly
society, harmony, and accountability of public officials, in descending order, as the three most
important societal values. In contrast, the Americans chose freedom of expression, personal freedom,
and the rights of the individual. See also Bridget Welsh, Attitudes Toward Democracy in Malaysia, 36
ASIAN SURV. 882, 884, 894 (1996) (reporting that a survey of Malaysians in 1994 found that the
majority were willing to limit democracy, particularly when social order was threatened, and that fears
of instability and Asian values led to limited support for democracy; also noting that respondents were
willing to sacrifice freedom of speech in the face of threats to social order, and that only forty percent
thought the press should be free to discuss sensitive issues, while only fifty-two percent thought it
should be free to criticize the government, with many of those favoring constructive criticism). For
several studies that show the high value assigned to order in China and limited demand for democracy,
see PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 53-56.
86. THE PEW RES. CENTER, THE PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, What do Asians think about
their lives? (2002), available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165 (last visited
Oct. 30, 2004).
87. COMISIÓN DE PROMOCIÓN DEL PERÚ, LATINOBAROMETER: PUBLIC OPINION IN LATIN
AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter LATINOBAROMETER]. See also Juan Forero, Latin America is Growing
Impatient
with
Democracy,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
24,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/international/americas/24PERU.html?ex=1089065297&ei=1&en=
7f452d7bbb6ecb14 (United Nations Report finds that 56% of Latin Americans said economic progress
is more important than democracy. Massive discontent has led to the downfall of six elected leaders
after violent unrest, growing support for neo-authoritarian leaders, and the granting of extrajudicial
powers to effective leaders. There have even been calls in Peru for the return of the authoritarian leader
Alberto Fujimori, who was run out of office on corruption charges).
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Moreover, just as impoverished Latin Americans have become
disillusioned with the third wave of democracy and are dissatisfied with
their governments, between 75% and 92% of citizens are dissatisfied with
the government in democratic Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia and the
Philippines. In contrast, almost half of Chinese and almost 70% of
Vietnamese are satisfied with the government.88
Interestingly, Asian citizens are generally satisfied with their own
lives and optimistic about the future, with between half and three-quarters
of respondents in India, China, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Bangladesh believing their lives would improve in the next
five years and less than 10% worried that their lives would not improve
during the same period.89 However, beliefs about future growth and
improvement in personal circumstances do not necessarily translate into
satisfaction with the current government in democratic states. One can
only speculate about what the implications for democracy would be if
people came to believe they would be worse off in the future under a
democratic regime.
Even when many Asians prefer democracy, they may prefer
majoritarian or nonliberal variants to liberal democracy. Nearly two-thirds
of Koreans agreed with the statement that “If we have political leaders who
are morally upright, we can let them decide everything”, 40% believed that
“the government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to
be discussed in society,” while 47% believed that “if people have too many
different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.”90 In contrast to South
Koreans and Taiwanese, there is overwhelming support for democracy
among Thais, with an astounding 90% satisfied with the way democracy
works in Thailand and 85% maintaining that democracy is always
preferable to authoritarianism.91 Nevertheless, half of Thais still rank
economic development as more important than democracy,92 suggesting
88. THE PEW RES. CENTER, supra note 86.
89. Japan, where 39% of people felt they lost ground in recent years, was the exception. Only 34%
of Japanese are optimistic about the chances of improvement in the next few years, with 27%
anticipating being worse off. Id.
90. Chong-min Park & Doh Chull Shin, Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy?
The Case of South Korea, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The Association for Asian Studies,
San Diego, Mar. 4-7, 2004, at 9, 13 (unpublished manuscript, on file with journal).
91. Robert B. Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, The Meaning of Democracy in a Developing
Nation, paper presented at the Political Science Association MPSA National Conference, Apr. 3-6,
2003, at 7-8, available at http://www.kpi.ac.th/en/meaning_of_democracy1.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2004).
92. Robert B. Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Support for Democracy in Thailand, paper
presented at the annual meeting of The Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, Mar. 4-7, 2004, at 9,
available at http://www.kpi.ac.th/download/Support%20(English).pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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popular support for the government’s current policies which emphasize
economic growth and majoritarian concerns even if at the expense of
individual liberties in some instances.93 Moreover, Thais remain distrustful
of political parties, while 75% view diversity of political and social views
as threatening, and 45% are unwilling to tolerate minority viewpoints.94
Nor is there a very deep commitment to rule of law and separation of
powers. A majority would accept government control over the judiciary or
even parliament to promote the wellbeing of the nation.95
That some Asian citizens would harbor doubts about the most recent
wave of democratization is understandable given the disappointing results
of earlier experiments with democracy in Asia and the lackluster
performance of many recently democratized states in other parts of the
world, which has led to a reversion to authoritarianism in several countries.
Indonesia tried democracy just after independence from the Dutch between
1950 and 1957. The experiment ended when Sukarno declared martial law.
Thailand has gone through numerous cycles of democratic elections
followed by military-led coups – since 1932, there have been some
seventeen coups attempts.96 South Korea held elections in the 1960s and
early 1970s before returning to authoritarian rule. The less-than-successful
experiments with democracy in the Philippines from 1935 led to the
declaration of martial law by Marcos in 1972. More generally, many thirdwave democracies have failed to generate economic growth or to deliver on
human rights promises, leading to massive discontent on the part of the
citizenry, calls to cut back on liberal rights in favor of a harsher law and
order agenda, and in some cases reversion to authoritarian governments.97

93. Cf. Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (noting that Thailand's current administration is, in many
ways, run like a business, leading to conflicts of interest in the protection of human rights).
94. Albritton & Bureekul, supra note 92 (however, only 25% agree that free speech is not worth it
if that means having to put up with a threat of social disorder, while over 90% believe that the political
leaders should tolerate views of challengers, suggesting that Thais are aware of the misuse of
restrictions on free speech in the name of public order and the use of defamation laws to curtail political
opposition).
95. Id.
96. CHRISTIE & ROY, supra note 58, at 161.
97. Between 1996 and 2000, only 27 to 37% of Latin Americans expressed satisfaction with
democracy. See Chu et al., supra note 82, at 129. Support for democracy in 2002 was lower than in
1996 in all but four countries. According to the LATINOBAROMETER, supra note 87, Latin Americans
have lost confidence in democracy because of the lack of economic growth, the deterioration of public
services, the rise of crime, and the persistence of widespread corruption. As a result, there is little trust
in democratic institutions, including political parties (19%), parliaments (22%), and the judiciary
(26%). Nevertheless, Latin Americans are reluctant to return to the recent past of authoritarian military
regimes. Only in Paraguay do the majority believe authoritarian government to be preferable to
democracy. In contrast, several authoritarian regimes in Asia have been successful in providing growth,
improving public services, ensuring stability, and curtailing corruption. Thus, whereas Latin Americans
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Although democracy may be messy everywhere, recent elections in
Asia have been particularly disheartening. The presidential elections in
Indonesia featured two former military men, who collectively received
more than a majority of the vote in the preliminary run-off. One of them,
General Wiranto, the head of Suharto’s former Golkar Party, is accused of
being a war criminal for attacks on civilians in East Timor.98 Far from
being disqualifying, the accusations seem to have caused some Indonesians
to support the General in a show of nationalist resistance to foreign
pressure and criticism. In the final round, former General Susilo Bambang
Yodhoyono won in a landslide over Megawati.
In India, the voters threw out a regime despite a growth rate of 8%,
opting instead for the Congress Party, led by the Italian born Sonia Ghandi,
widow of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi – who then
promptly decided not to take office. The turmoil caused the single biggest
one-day drop in the stock markets ever, although the markets recovered
when Ghandi named an economist known for his market-orientation to
head her party.99 The elections - marred by the deaths of over 20 women
and children in a stampede to secure sarees, boycotts of the polls in
Kashmir by separatist militants and a bomb that killed eleven people
attending a political rally, the murder of 26 policemen by Maoist guerillas
in Jharkhand, the shooting deaths of three political party members in Bihar,
and the usual charges of rampant vote-buying – were described as
relatively clean and successful by Indian standards.100
In the Philippines, where former actor Joseph Estrada was impeached
and forced out of office after being linked to illegal payoffs from gambling
lords, President Arroyo squared off against another leading film actor,
Fernando Poe, a high school drop out who had never held public office,
although he did once play a town mayor in the movies. Poe studiously
avoided the issues in a campaign long on symbol and short on substance on
the part of both candidates.101
see no alternative to democracy, many Asians see some form of soft authoritarianism or nonliberal
democracy as viable options.
98. Guido Guillart, Associated Press, UN-Backed Tribunal Issues Arrest Warrant for Former
Indonesian Army Chief, available at LEXIS, News Library .
99. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT EXECUTIVE BRIEFING No. 310, INDIA: GOING, GOING,
GHANDI 2, (May 18, 2004).
100. Asia: The Greatest Show on Earth; India's Election, ECONOMIST, April 17, 2004, at 58
(describing the ills besetting Indian politics as: "not just of constituencies handed down like family
heirlooms; but also of venal, sometimes thuggish and often outright criminal candidates; of parties
appealing not on the basis of policies but of narrow regional or caste interests; of coalitions formed not
out of like-minded ideologies but out of naked power-seeking").
101. Marites Danguilan Vitug, Star Power Holds Perils for the Philippines; Celebrity Politics,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 20, 2004, at 8.
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In Taiwan, Chen Shuibian seemed willing to risk confrontation with
Beijing just to stay in office, continually challenging Beijing and
Washington with calls for a national referendum and constitutional
changes, despite stern warnings from Beijing and Washington to avoid
further provocation. Even close observers of Taiwanese politics - used to,
as they are, fisticuffs and chair-throwing by members of the legislature –
were shocked by the dirty politics in which the KMT compared Chen to
Hitler, and then the bizarre shooting of the president and vice-president by
a slow-moving bullet on the day before elections.102 Capitalizing on the
sympathy vote from the shooting, Chen claimed victory by less than 30,000
votes out of a total of 13.3 million. After weeks of protests and
demonstrations both peaceful and otherwise by supporters of the LDP,
Chen was sworn into office, and must now lead a deeply divided public.
Meanwhile, in South Korea, President Roh was impeached on charges
of illegal campaigning, corruption among his aides and mismanagement of
the economy, then acquitted and reinstated.103 However, his subsequent
attempt to replace several cabinet members without following
constitutional procedures gave rise to complaints of amateurism and
unflattering comparisons to the heavy-handed ways of former dictators.104
The experiences of Asian countries demonstrate that democracy is no
panacea, and that democratization will not necessarily lead to
improvements in human rights, resolve ethnic tensions, or ensure economic
growth and better standards of living. In some cases, there may be a
tension between democracy and the protection of rights and other goals.
The problems with democracy in Asia do not support the conclusion that
authoritarian regimes would necessarily be preferable. They do suggest,
however, the possibility that democracy may not be the only or best option
in all circumstances. Of course, authoritarian regimes also have their
problems, and not all have been successful in ensuring economic growth or
improving citizens’ lives. Thus much depends on the specific nature of the
regime. At minimum, the performance of both democratic and nondemocratic regimes should be scrutinized and evaluated objectively and
without bias.105 Democracy proponents often argue in the face of poor
102. See Anthony Lawrance, Nobody Said Democracy Is a Tea Party, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 27, 2004, at 13 (recounting the events of the Taiwanese election).
103. U.N. Secretary General to Make Congratulatory Call to Roh, YONHAP ENG. NEWS, May 18,
2004, 2004 WL 79245193.
104. Amateurism Impairs Roh Regime, KOREAN TIMES, May 27, 2004, 2004 WL 80168596.
105. Amnesty International and State Department reports, which provide much of the data for
rights indexes, have historically been biased against non-liberal democratic regimes. To take one
example, reporting on China, especially by human rights organizations and the mass media, is on the
whole overwhelmingly negative. Reports tend to focus on individual civil and political rights cases,
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economic performance, massive demonstrations, calls for regime change,
and elections marred by violence and vote-buying, that democracy is
“messy.”106 However, the same apologists for democracy are quick to
criticize every shortcoming under an authoritarian regime, to blame the
problems on the nondemocratic nature of the government and to call for
immediate elections as a solution. One can only imagine the scorn that
would be heaped on anyone so bold as to offer in response to political
violence, widespread corruption, and other social maladies in authoritarian
states, the limp excuse that “authoritarianism is messy.”
D. Culture and Religion
As critics of Asian values have pointed out, the Asian region clearly
boasts a wide diversity of religious systems and cultural practices. The
wide diversity prevents simplistic conclusions based on stereotypes about
Confucians or Muslims or Asian communitarians. Nevertheless, as the
various surveys cited in this Article show, values continue to affect the
outcome across a wide range of rights issues.
Cultural factors would seem to explain in part the relatively greater
restrictions on free speech and the media in both democratic and
often either ignoring or paying short shrift to China's accomplishments in raising living standards,
improving the legal system, and negotiating the difficult transition to a market economy without major
chaos. More generally, discussions of human rights in China frequently lack a comparative framework
that would put China's record as a lower-middle-income transitional country in perspective. Despite
China's overall steady progress across a range of human rights indicators, State Department reports in
1999, 2000 and 2001 claimed that the human rights situation deteriorated or worsened. Every year the
reports have painted a dismal picture, with reports from 1995 to 2004 claiming "widespread" violations,
and reports from 2002 to 2004 report claiming "numerous" and "serious" abuses. See Peerenboom,
supra note 2.
Although the bias against non-liberal democracies is most obvious in the area of civil and political
rights, the bias is also evident in discussions of rule of law and good governance. As noted, China
outperforms the average in its income class on rule of law and good governance. Yet mentioning rule
of law in relation to China often meets with wide-eyed disbelief and derision. Some knowledgeable
legal commentators even argue that China lacks a legal system. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 50
(critiquing claims that China lacks a legal system). One of the main reasons that China's efforts to
implement rule of law are so summarily dismissed is that commentators conflate rule of law with liberal
democracy. For the same reason, many liberal human rights critics claim that Singapore lacks rule of
law, even though Singapore's legal system is routinely ranked among the best – if not the best – in the
world. The bias against nondemocratic regimes is also evident in the U.S. application of intellectual
property-related trade sanctions. Throughout the 1990s and still today, China and Russia have been
guilty of widespread and roughly comparable intellectual property violations. Yet while China was
designated a Priority Foreign Country four times, Russia never made the list. Members of the U.S.
Congress defended the differential treatment on the ground that the U.S. needed to cut the fledgling
democracy in Russia some slack. Peerenboom, supra note 2.
106. See, e.g., Lawrance, supra note 102, at 13 (positive voter turnout and election results in
Taiwan largely forgotten in midst of street protests and commentary alleging that balloting was suspect
and the election was a fraud).
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nondemocratic states.107 The restrictions are most apparent in North Korea
and Myanmar, although Singapore, Malaysia, China and Vietnam are also
known for tight limits on the press.108 But even the more democratic
countries in the region keep a short leash on the press and free speech by
citizens.
South Korean President Roh has declared that the government will
take legal action against any news organization that publishes editorials
containing false information regarding government policy or personnel. In
2003, Roh personally brought a libel suit against four major newspapers
that allegedly defamed him and his family by publishing falsehoods about
his fund-raising activities and real estate transactions.109
In Indonesia, after a period of expansive freedom of speech and the
press during the Habibe and Wahid years, the Megawati government,
supported by a public increasingly wary of unfettered expression, pushed
through a law that imposed several restrictions on freedom of expression,
assembly, and the press. The former editor of a daily paper was found
guilty of insulting the chairman of the Golkar party currently serving as
speaker of legislature, while another editor was prosecuted for insulting
Megawati.110
Meanwhile, in Thailand, television and radio stations remain publicly
owned, and the government has used the leverage gained from licensing
and advertisements to influence press coverage, resulting in self-censorship
and the sacking of editors critical of the government.111 Freedom House
therefore demoted Thailand from “free” to “partly free” status.112
Despite a liberal press, India continues to prosecute people who
criticize the judiciary, while libel cases remain common.113 Even in Japan,
a broad ban on incitement of illegal activities, permit requirements for

107. For polling data, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 50; Welsh, supra note 85; Sim, supra note 85;
Albritton & Bureekul, supra note 91; Park and Shin, supra note 90.
108. See John Gillespie, Evolving Concepts of Human Benefits and Rights in Vietnam, in THE
RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14 (noting that current restrictions reflect in part the realization
on the part of the ruling regime that free speech and media destabilized the former colonial regime).
109. Hahm, supra note 75.
110. Juwana, supra note 23.
111. Muntarbhorn, supra note 24.
112. Asia's Media Have Few Reasons to Celebrate World Press Freedom Day, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESS, May 2, 2004, available at http://www.worldrevolution.org/article/1293 (last visited Oct. 30,
2004) (also noting the Philippines was demoted from free to partly free for failure to protect journalists
and to prosecute those who murder journalists).
113. Upendra Baxi, Protection of Human Rights and Production of Human Rightlessness in India,
in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14.
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demonstrations, and other restrictions allow the government considerable
room to restrict free speech in the name of public order.114
Religion also remains a crucial and oftentimes divisive factor in
several states, leading to broad state powers to restrict religious practice in
the name of social order and harmony. Governments in the region are
extremely wary of the volatile mix of religion and politics. At one extreme,
Islamic fundamentalism has fueled insurgency and separatist movements in
Thailand, Indonesia, and China, and raised concerns in multi-ethnic
Malaysia and Singapore.115 China is also wary of Tibetan Buddhists’
support for the Dalai Lama. Religious groups have also fought with each
other, resulting in bloody conflicts in India, Indonesia, and elsewhere.
Countermeasures in these countries have ranged from violent
repression and the imposition of martial law along with derogation of
rights, to registration requirements for religious organizations, limits on
venues of worship, restrictions on or prohibitions of religious education,
limitations on hate speech or other speech that could incite religious
conflicts, and banning of the wearing of religious symbols such as veils or
headscarves in public.116 In China, members of the five official churches
are allowed to practice without undue restrictions. However, members of
unapproved house churches who have sought to unite with the Pope and
advocated religious-based practices that are at odds with the government
policies on contraception and abortion have been harassed and
prosecuted.117 With a regulatory regime much like China’s, Vietnam
tolerates and even encourages religious practice provided the religion does
114. See Shigenori Matsui, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Japan, in THE RIGHTS OF
ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14 (noting that despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression,
political speech and public demonstrations are widely restricted in Japan).
115. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24; Juwana, supra note 23; Peerenboom, supra note 2; Li-ann
Thio, Taking Rights Seriously? Human Rights in Singapore, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra
note 14; and H. P. Lee, Human Rights in Malaysia, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14.
116. See Thio, supra note 115 (describing measures taken by Singapore, many at the discretion of
the executive and not subject to judicial review); Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (discussing the history of
Southern Thailand and noting that there have been intermittent clashes with security forces there);
Juwana, supra note 23 (discussing the Indonesian government's role in regulating and promoting
religion); Peerenboom, supra note 2 (discussing China's implementation of religious restrictions and its
crackdown on Falun Gong); Carol Evans, Chinese Law and the International Protection of Religious
Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 749, 758 (2002) (noting the legal restrictions placed on the free practice
of religion in China). See also, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONCERNING COUNTRIES
OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (Feb. 18, 2004) available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/29560.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2004) (noting that fatal attacks against the Muslims and Christians led to the killing of more
than a thousand people in Gujarat, India in 2002).
117. U.S DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, CHINA (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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not become a source of opposition to government policies or undermine
efforts to establish the “Great Unity” of Vietnamese society.118 In
Singapore, religious leaders who challenge state policies or become
involved in political issues have run afoul of government policies that try to
confine religious groups to educational, social and charitable work, rather
than “radical social action.”119
Drawing a balance between freedom of religion and political stability
has proven especially difficult with respect to new religions or cults.
Aware that religious groups have destabilized dynasties in the past, China
imposes content-based restrictions on “cults” and “abnormal” religious
beliefs and practices.120 The crackdown on Falun Gong has received the
most attention abroad, although the group considers itself a breathing
exercise group rather than a religion. The government has justified the ban
by citing the sect’s increasingly political agenda, organized demonstrations
including one where more than 10,000 people suddenly surrounded
Zhongnanhai (the seat of the government), and the deaths of more than
1600 adherents, including the self-immolation of five people, one of them a
12-year old girl.121 The government has also outlawed a number of other
sects, claiming they lack theological training, preach the coming of the
Apocalypse or Holy War, exploit members for financial gain or commit
other violations of generally applicable laws such as rape, assault, and tax
fraud. Beijing defends the policies by citing similar restrictions on cults in
other countries, including France and Belgium.122 In the Asian region,
Japan’s Supreme Court upheld the ban on Aum Shinrikyo after its leaders
were arrested for releasing poisonous gas in the subway in Tokyo.123
Singapore has also banned Jehovah Witnesses for refusing to serve in the
military.124 South Korea, faced with a similar problem, refused to
recognize Jehovah Witnesses as conscientious objectors.125

118. Gillespie, supra note 108.
119. See Thio, supra note 115 (noting that religious freedoms in Singapore are limited by the need
to preserve harmony and national security).
120. See generally MARIA HSIA CHANG: FALUN GONG, THE END OF DAYS (2004) (offering a
history of religious uprisings in China, and discussing the Chinese government's current conflict with
Falun Gong); Anne S.Y. Cheung, In Search of a Theory of Cult and Freedom of Religion in China: The
Case of Falun Gong, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 13-17 (2004) (noting the historical pattern of the
Chinese government's containment and control of new religious groups); Evans, supra note 116, at 758
(strong discouragement by the Chinese government of the practice of non-official religions).
121. For a more extensive discussion, see PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 91-101.
122. Id.
123. Matsui, supra note 114.
124. Thio, supra note 115.
125. Hahm, supra note 75.
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Unfortunately, international law provides little useful guidance in
distinguishing normal from abnormal religious activities and legitimate
groups from cults.126 More generally, the potential for religious authority
to challenge and undermine state authority has led to a wavering and
incoherent doctrine both internationally and domestically in many countries
with respect to such issues as separation of church and state, and reasonable
restrictions on religious practice.127 Within Asia alone, freedom of religion
exists side by side with state-endorsed atheism in China and Vietnam, and
Islam as the official state religion in Malaysia. Meanwhile, in the
Philippines, Catholicism is privileged in numerous ways, including
constitutional provisions on abortion and divorce that reflect Catholic
religious principles;128 in Japan, Shinto remains favored, with courts
reluctant to hold visits by state leaders to Shinto shrines to be a violation of
the principle of separation of state and church;129 and in Thailand,
Buddhism is so dominant as to constitute implicitly the official religion.130
E. Legal Institutions
Empirical studies have only begun to explore the relationship between
legal institutions and the protection of different types of rights.131 While
promising, this approach is likely to produce indeterminate and inconsistent
results because of the wide variation among countries on key legal
institutions and practices such as separation of powers, constitutional
review, judicial review of executive power, judicial independence, and the
appointment of judges. Asian legal systems are no exception, differing

126. PEERENBOOM, supra note 50, at 95-96; Evans, supra note 116, at 762-763..
127. Theo van Boven, Advances and Obstacles in Building Understanding and Respect between
People of Diverse Religions and Beliefs, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 437, 442 (1991) (estimating that in the 1980s
twenty-five regional or civil wars were based to a significant degree on disputes stemming in part from
religious beliefs).
128. Raul Pangalangan, Human Rights in the Philippines, in THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra
note 14.
129. Matsui, supra note 114.
130. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (noting that while Buddhism is not mentioned expressly as
the state religion in the Thailand Constitution, it is implied).
131. See Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19(1) INT'L REV. LAW
& ECON. 87, 93 (1999) (finding that judicial independence is significant with respect to the protection
of political rights and search and seizure even after controlling for wealth and other factors, but finding
that federalism and separation of powers were not significant and the presence of constitutional
provisions regarding search and seizure seem to have no real-world significance); Clair Apodaca, The
Rule of Law and Human Rights, 87 JUDICATURE 292, 298–99 (2004) (finding that rule of law and
judicial independence were instrumental in securing both economic and physical integrity rights,
although rule of law frequently gives way even in rich countries with well-developed legal systems
during times of international or domestic conflict). See also Keith and Poe, supra note 20 (examining
the effect of constitutional constraints on the repression of personal integrity rights).
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widely in institutions, practices, and conceptions of rule of law.132
Moreover, legal institutions that function well in one context may produce
very different outcomes in other contexts.
What does seem clear from the broad empirical studies as well as the
experiences of Asian countries to date is that judicial independence is
generally important if not sufficient for the protection of rights, particularly
civil and political rights. The regimes with the least independent courts
have some of the worst records in protecting civil and political rights,
including China, Vietnam, Myanmar and North Korea. On the whole,
democratization has resulted in increased independence of the courts and a
more active role in protecting rights, most notably in South Korea, Taiwan
and Indonesia.
However, judicial independence alone does not ensure that the courts
will play an active role in protecting rights. The level of judicial activism
varies tremendously in the region. At one extreme, despite a conception of
fundamental rights as inherent or the natural rights of all human beings and
explicit constitutional references to such open-ended notions as
unenumerated rights and human dignity, Japanese courts have exercised
their powers of judicial review sparingly in the service of rights,
interpreting public welfare limitations on rights broadly and generally
deferring to the legislature.133 Courts in Singapore and Malaysia also
continue to interpret rights narrowly, relying on a positivist rather than a
purposive or natural law-based method of interpretation.
At the other extreme are the Indian, Taiwanese, and Filipino courts.
The India Supreme Court and the Grand Justices of Taiwan have gone so
far as to strike down constitutional amendments as unconstitutional.134 In
the Philippines, the court has aggressively engaged in social and economic
policymaking by interpreting “directive principles” in the constitution.
To be sure, activist does not necessarily mean liberal. In Thailand, the
courts have shown a conservative inclination to side with entrenched
interest groups.135 Similarly, although Indian courts have come to the aid
of the disenfranchised in a variety of ways, the courts remain organs of the

132. See generally ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1 (discussing the differences in rule of law in
the United States, France, and East Asian countries).
133. See Matsui, supra note 114 (discussing the reluctance of Japanese courts in interfering with
legislative programs).
134. Upendra Baxi, Rule of Law in India: Theory and Practice, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note
1, at 337-38; Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 531, 531at n. * (2002).
135. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Rule of Law and Aspects of Human Rights in Thailand: From
Conceptualization to Implementation, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1, at 346, 362.
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state, with judges inclined by personal circumstances and professional
training toward moderate rather than radical solutions.136
The aggressiveness of the courts also varies by category of right.
National laws frequently prohibit or limit judicial review of many national
security decisions. But even when judicial review is possible, Asian courts
have been reluctant to challenge executive and parliamentary decisions
involving national security.137
Similarly, the role of courts is limited in China, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea with respect to many
social and economic rights by the traditional view that such rights are
generally not justiciable or that they involve resource allocation decisions
best left to the legislature. Nevertheless, even where such rights are
considered nonjusticiable, Asian governments generally have taken
seriously their obligations to provide the necessary minimal conditions for
human flourishing, subject to resource constraints largely in line with GDP
levels, as the empirical studies indicate. The conceptualization however is
not so much in terms of rights as traditional paternalistic beliefs that rulers
are obligated to ensure the material and spiritual wellbeing of the people.
For instance, in China, the new leadership of Hu and Wen has shown
sensitivity to issues of social justice, implementing a number of policies to
ease the hardships of those who have lost out in the transition to a more
competitive capitalist economic system. In so doing, they are able to draw
on a rich tradition of “people as the basis” stretching back to Mencius.
While such traditions are grounded in a nonliberal paternalistic worldview,
they nonetheless provide a normative basis for social, economic, cultural,
and collective rights claims today.138
136. Baxi, supra note 134, at 339 (noting that Indian activists "remain familiar with the meandering
nature of judicial activism.” Even as they engage the activist judiciary in the tasks of Indian democratic
renewal, their politics of hope remains moderated by the acknowledgement of the brute institutional fact
that courts and justices remain, at the end of the day, state-bound and -permeated beings."); Jamie
Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J.
COMP. L. 495, 515 (1989) (warning that India's activist judges have been criticized for violating rule of
law, and that not all judicial decisions have favored the oppressed and less fortunate).
137. For a discussion of physical integrity rights and derogation of rights in times of emergency,
national security laws, and the effects of the war on terrorism in Asia, see generally THE RIGHTS OF
ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14.
138. Policies, as well as underlying philosophies, in the area of social or welfare rights vary
considerably from country to country in terms of the required or appropriate role for government. China
and Vietnam have little problem reconciling broad welfare policies with state socialism. In contrast,
Singapore emphasizes the need to avoid welfare dependency while providing individuals the
opportunities and resources to become self-sustaining, as captured in the slogan: give me a fish, and I
eat for a day; teach me to fish and I eat for a lifetime. Nevertheless, the government provides
subsidized housing, schooling, and medical care. Hong Kong, despite its commitment to laissez faire
economic principles, also provides subsidized housing, schooling, and medical care. See generally Ian
Holliday, Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia, 48 (4) POL. STUD. 706, 712–13
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On the other hand, several Asian countries have developed an active
jurisprudence of economic and social rights, in keeping with a
redistributive, developmental model of rule of law that emphasizes
redistribution of wealth and social justice issues domestically, and the right
of development, debt forgiveness and the obligation of the North/developed
countries to aid the South/developing countries internationally.139 The
Indonesian constitution contains a long list of social and economic rights,
while Indian and Filipino courts have blurred or overcome the distinction
between justiciable and non-justiciable right through interpretation of
constitutional references to programmatic goals and directive principles.
The involvement of the judiciary in these complex social and economic
policy issues has naturally been controversial, and challenged both in terms
of the merits of the decisions and in terms of judicial competence and the
proper role for the courts.140 A particularly pressing issue is whether wellintentioned reformers who push for the incorporation of such a broad array
of positive rights in the constitutions of countries at relatively low levels of
economic development are not setting the government up for failure by
promising citizens more than the government can possibly deliver.141 In
India, the Bharatiya Janata Party government was voted out of office
despite overseeing a period of rapid economic growth. The vote reflected a
deep dissatisfaction with growing income disparities and widespread
poverty amidst the growing wealth of some segments of society. The
BJP’s campaign slogan of India Shining only highlighted the discrepancies
between the haves and the have-nots. By way of comparison, in wealthy
South Korea, which has not made social rights justiciable, the government
only this year made good on its promise to provide an equal education for
all by providing nine years of compulsory education free of charge.142
Indonesia offers another cautionary tale. After the fall of Suharto,
reformers, flush with optimism, wrote into the Indonesian constitution
some of the most forward-leaning ideas of the human rights movement.
(2000) (providing a discussion of social welfare policy in Hong Kong, Singapore, and other East Asian
countries).
139. Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1, at 29-31.
140. See, e.g., Raul Pangalangan, The Philippine "People Power" Constitution, Rule of Law, and
the Limits of Liberal Constitutionalism, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra note 1, at 371, 376.
141. See, generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS?: POST
COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225 (Adras Sajo ed., 1996); but see Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik
Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2004) (arguing that courts need to support social
rights, if more in a directive fashion that provides the legislature flexibility in implementation rather
than by specifying an immediate particular minimum level of entitlement for individuals, because such
decisions may provide governments the political leverage to resist the harmful prescriptions of
international financial organizations regarding democratization and marketization).
142. Hahm, supra note 75.
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Accordingly, the constitution now provides that each person has the right to
physical and spiritual welfare, to have a home, to enjoy a good and healthy
living environment and to obtain health services.143 Reflecting the
“capabilities” approach, each person is entitled to assistance and special
treatment to gain the same opportunities and benefits in the attainment of
equality and justice.144 The Megawatti government in low-income
Indonesia has not been able to live up to such broad commitments or even
to effectively deal with terrorism and rising crime rates. Realizing that
writing rights into the constitution does not ensure the resources necessary
for their implementation, the general populace seems to have become wary
of the utopian promises of human rights non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) on the one hand, and their constant criticisms of the government
obviously lacking the means to deliver on such promises on the other.145
Thailand may be experiencing a similar dynamic. Now that Thailand
has democratized, the government is struggling to improve the standards of
living for citizens. The ruling party has acted in many ways like a
traditional Asian government, with a strong executive pushing through
policies aimed at ensuring economic development and a better standard of
living for the majority. As a result, the economy has recovered, and the
deterioration in quality of life as measured by the UNDP HDI index has
reversed. Yet NGOs and rights activists remain critical of government
policies, pointing out how, notwithstanding considerable progress,
problems remain with respect to disadvantaged hilltribe peoples and
socially vulnerable individuals, and how economic development has come

143. 1945 CONST. of the REPUBLIC of INDON. art. 28H(1) (amended 2002), available at
http://www.indonesianembassy.org.ar/Novedades/constitution1.htm (official) (last visited Oct. 22,
2004).
144. Id. at art. 28H(2).
145. See Juwana, supra note 23 (noting that the increase in NGOs and the improvements in
substantive law have not necessarily resulted in the expansion of human rights). NGOs face a number
of challenges in a transitional landscape, including that they will often find themselves in a position of
criticizing some of the former opposition figures who were their partners and now are government
leaders. NGOs may also find it difficult to reconcile their more critical, idealistic approach to rights
issues with a more pragmatic approach, or be unwilling or unable to modify oppositional tactics to
accommodate a more cooperative partnership with the new regime. They may also lose their local
support base and become perceived as instruments of foreign states and actors out of touch with local
circumstances.
See Christine Bell and Johanna Keenan, Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the Problems of Transition, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 330, 346–47 (2004) (once in power
even the rights-friendly Mandela criticized NGOs, noting that "many of our nongovernmental
organizations are not in fact NGO's, both because they have no popular base and the actuality that they
rely on the domestic and foreign governments, rather than the people, for their material sustenance."
(quoting from Report by the President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, to the 50th National Conference of
the
African
National
Congress,
Dec.
17,
1997,
available
at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference50/presaddress.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004)).

021405 PEERENBOOM.DOC

2004]

4/26/2005 4:29 PM

SHOW ME THE MONEY

121

at the expense of transparency and political participation.146 To be sure, the
Thailand constitution has incorporated broad ideals such as “human
dignity,” and NGO critics raise legitimate concerns. But governments in
middle-income countries such as Thailand will inevitably have difficulty
living up to such idealistic standards. The broad public seems more
tolerant and supportive of the government efforts to address issues within
the limits of available resources.
Although judicial independence is generally important to the
protection of rights, relying on courts alone is clearly not sufficient to
protect rights adequately. Courts are limited by political constraints,
restrictive laws, interpretive traditions and their inability to control
financial decisions and implement their own decisions. A variety of other
institutions have arisen to assist courts in protecting rights, including
national human rights commissions, ombudsmen and a vast network of
NGOs.
Several states have established national human rights commissions,
including Thailand, Indonesia, India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. On the
whole, the commissions have mixed records. Many rights advocates were
skeptical about Malaysia’s human rights commission Sukaham, fearing that
it would end up serving as a mouthpiece for the government. Sukaham’s
inclusion in the foreign ministry, headed by a foreign minister who
objected to the liberal biases of the human rights movement and argued that
Malaysia should not be judged based on international conventions,
suggested that its main purpose was to better defend the government
against foreign criticism.147 However, the commission has interpreted its
mandate broadly to include social and economic rights, pushed for
ratification of international treaties, and issued reports critical of the
government, including calling for the amendment or repeal of the Internal
Security Act. At the same time, Sukuham has been reluctant to take sides
in Malaysia’s complicated cultural and racial issues. This selective
approach may in part reflect the indeterminacy of international human
rights laws in these areas, and the problems of applying abstract and
general principles to complex local contexts. Sukuham may also have been
acting strategically, however, trying to gain a foothold and build up a
certain amount of popular support and legitimacy in an environment where
government support remains equivocal, by avoiding issues that are deeply

146. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (noting that hill tribes have been disadvantaged in the
education of their children and in their quest for Thai nationality).
147. Amanda Whiting, Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia's National
Human Rights Commission, 39(1) STAN. J. INT'L L. 59, 75 (2003).
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divisive within Malaysian society and likely to upset the majority whose
support is crucial for the commission’s survival.
In Indonesia, the human rights commission enjoyed popular support
during the Suharto era, when the majority was united in opposition to
Suharto. However, the commission has been taken less seriously after
democratization both by the government and the public.148 As in many
countries, some of the members on the commission tend to be forwardleaning activists pushing the most liberal interpretation of international
rights law and the latest UN agenda. More conservative members of the
commission have challenged the more liberal positions of the activist
members. The resulting ideological conflict has reduced the commission’s
effectiveness. The governments, whether of Habibe, Wahid, or Megawati,
have had their hands full dealing with terrorism, rising Islamic
fundamentalism, unrest in Aceh, and the usual developmental problems
faced by a low-income country. Naturally, they have not welcomed
criticism from commission members of every shortcoming and lapse from
the idealistic standards of international covenants.149
Human rights commissions have experienced conflicts with the courts
as well as the executive branch and the public. In the Philippines, the
Supreme Court ruled in a series of cases that the commission had no power
to provide remedies, but was limited to conducting investigations and
issuing reports. Apart from concerns about inconsistency, the court seemed
eager to defend its turf and its role in the post-authoritarian polity as the
main defender of rights and protector of the people. In Indonesia, the
human rights commission has been limited in effectiveness because of the
lack of coordination among the various institutions with some role in
protecting rights.150
Regional rights systems have played an instrumental role in
facilitating the development of rights norms, jurisprudence, and
implementation, especially in Europe. Unlike the Americas, Europe and
Africa, Asia lacks a regional rights system. One possible explanation is
that there is a greater diversity of values, political systems and conceptions
of rights in Asia. However, a more likely explanation is that Asian
governments have been reluctant to establish a regional rights body out of
traditional sovereignty concerns that it is not appropriate for other countries
or a regional body to intervene in how other countries handle human rights
148. Juwana, supra note 23.
149. In Thailand as well, the government has taken steps to rein in the human rights commission
and human rights NGOs. See Muntarbhorn, supra note 24 (describing situations where Thailand
government instruments have restricted the work of human rights organizations).
150. Juwana, supra note 23.
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issues, except in circumstances where there are widespread and systematic
violations of rights. In addition, Asian governments have on the whole
emphasized economic development and political stability. However, the
need for a regional entity to promote economic development and
geopolitical stability is already filled by the increasingly robust ASEAN.
F.

Population Size and Ethnic Diversity

Larger populations are associated with more rights violations in
absolute terms and per capita, because there is likely to be greater conflict
among different interest or ethnic groups and the government may be more
willing to resort to force to curtail potential threats to social order given the
larger number of people that would be affected by social chaos.
Populations run the gamut from China at 1.3 billion to Singapore at 4.1
million. The populations of the other countries are: India 1.03 billion,
United States 288 million, Indonesia 214 million, Japan 127 million,
Vietnam 79 million, the Philippines 77 million, Thailand 66 million, France
59 million, South Korea 47 million, Malaysia 23 million, and Hong Kong 7
million.
Population does help explain rights performance in some cases,
particularly for China and India. First, their huge populations are directly
tied to quality of life issues as reflected in social and economic measures
because limited resources are spread thin over large numbers. Second, as
elsewhere, population size is also a proxy for ethnic diversity. Ethnic
diversity has led to conflicts with the state as some groups push for greater
independence in both countries. It has also led to conflicts among ethnic
groups seeking a larger share of resources and demanding affirmative
action, preferential tax benefits, and exemptions to generally applicable
laws and regulations.151 The response in China to such conflicts has
included both carrots and sticks. Carrots include the establishment of
special autonomous zones, affirmative actions policies and the allocation of
additional resources to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty in
ethnic areas. Sticks include restrictions on the civil and political rights in
the name of national security, public order, and social harmony. Third, the
sheer size of the population results in a “large” number of violations of
physical integrity rights and civil and political rights, even though
proportionally the number is small. China and India’s low level-4 rating on
the Political Terror Scale is based on the relatively high absolute number of
personal integrity rights violations rather than the low per capita figures.
Fourth, and more substantively, the size of the population makes control
more difficult, instability more likely, and the expected danger value,
151. See Peerenboom, supra note 2 (detailing the conflicts among ethnic minorities in China).
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calculated by the multiplying the likelihood of instability by the
consequences of chaos, higher. In a country the size of China or India,
even the most radical anti-government movements and bizarre cults may
attract a significant number of followers, especially now that Internet has
eliminated the barrier of communication across distance.
The degree of ethnic diversity is arguably as important as the mere
size of the population.152 The ethnic diversity of several Asian countries
has affected human rights protection both directly, through a variety of
complicated schemes that balance affirmative action and nondiscrimination, and indirectly, by adding to civil tensions that have resulted
in harsh crackdowns and limitations on civil and political liberties. India’s
constitutional history and the broad powers granted to the government to
order preventive detention cannot be understood without reference to its’
struggle for independence from Britain, the legacy of ethnic-based tensions
resulting from the attempt to divide the territory into Hindu India and
Muslim Pakistan, and the continuing pressure of ethnic and religious-based
secessionist movements and tensions that often erupt into violent clashes.153
Ethnic diversity has also been invoked to support broad state powers and
tough national security laws in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and China,
while an upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism has led to martial law in parts
of Indonesia and Thailand.
Asian countries have adopted a variety of approaches to cultural rights
in response to ethnic and religious diversity, from a melting pot approach
that emphasizes assimilation, to a “salad bowl” approach that seeks to
celebrate different traditions and cultures, to a pragmatic approach that
steers a middle course and emphasizes social stability and harmony.154
Some states, including Malaysia and India, have adopted a group-rights
approach, whereas others, such as Singapore, seek to protect groups by
protecting the rights of the individuals that make up the group.
India has opted for the salad bowl approach. The Indian Constitution
provides strong protections for religious and cultural minorities. Problems
152. Steven C. Poe & Scott Walker, Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries' Respect for Human
Rights?, 24(1) HUM. RTS. Q. 237, 259–60 (2002) (finding that realization of rights is more difficult in
ethnically diverse societies, that low to medium diversity appears to be necessary although not
sufficient for the highest level of civil rights, and that more diversity leads to worse performance with
respect to political rights, subsistence rights, civil rights, and the social and economic equality of
women, though the relationships are statistically significant only for civil rights and social and
economic equality for women).
153. Baxi, supra note 113.
154. Media's Role in Sealing Social Unity, STRAITS TIMES, Sep. 7, 1998, at 1 (rejecting the melting
pot and salad bowl metaphors, Prime Minister Goh described Singaporean policy as a mosaic in which
the different communities form a harmonious whole, with each piece retaining its own colour and
vibrancy).
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arise, however, when religious and cultural practices are at odds with
international rights. For example, Muslim personal law may disadvantage
women, while traditional Hindu beliefs discriminate against untouchables.
In response, the government has adopted a complicated two-track system
that emphasizes reform to certain Hindu practices system while leaving
other ethnic and religious issues to be sorted out over time.
Malaysia has adopted a group-based approach that recognizes Islam as
the state religion and affords special privileges to the dominant but
historically economically weak Malay population. Special treatment
includes electoral laws that ensure Malay control, designation of Malay as
the national language, prominent displays of Malayan culture in official
ceremonies and on television programs, and economic policies aimed at
improving the lot of Malays. Naturally, the large Chinese minority has
resented such affirmative action policies. After the race riots in 1969, the
government passed an emergency security law that provided police wide
powers of preventive detention. The government has also passed laws to
prohibit speech or actions that would promote feelings of ill-will, enmity,
hatred, disharmony, or disunity, or which question the special position of
Malays.155
In keeping with the rejection of group rights in favor of an individualrights approach, Singapore rejects affirmative action based on group
membership. The government also seeks to instill a national identity
without trying to eradicate more particularistic cultural identities, which it
does not believe possible. Notwithstanding its commitment to meritocracy,
the government recognizes the need to protect racial and religious
minorities. Accordingly, it has recognized the distinctive cultural and
economic needs of indigenous Malays, most of whom are Muslim.156
Religious education is a divisive issue in several states due to the
potential use of religious education to foster demands for political
autonomy and independence, greater political representation or a greater
share of resources. Accordingly, some states, including Vietnam, China,
India, and Thailand, impose various restrictions on religious education.
Singapore allows religious education but requires that students be able to
meet generally applicable standards in certain basic subjects.
Bilingual education is another sensitive issue in Asia, as elsewhere.
While the right to be educated in one’s mother tongue may be central to

155. H. P. Lee, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in Malaysia, in ASIAN DISCOURSES, supra
note 1, at 237- 241.
156. See Thio, supra note 115 (noting that the Singaporean Constitution enjoins certain government
action in order to protect the rights and religion of Malays).
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one’s cultural identity, failure to speak the language of the majority may
also limit one’s opportunities for development.
G. Colonial History
Every country in the region except Thailand has experienced
colonialism, often by several different powers, sometimes at the same time.
Although the results of studies are somewhat inconsistent, on the whole
they tend to show that a history of British colonialism is associated with
better human rights protection, whereas Japanese colonialism and French
colonialism may be associated with worse human rights records.157 It is,
however, impossible to draw any hard and fast conclusions from the
colonial experiences of countries in Asia. In some cases, British
colonialism has been instrumental in laying the foundations for a rule of
law compliant legal system. However, British rule was hardly democratic
or liberal, and citizens of countries ruled by the British did not enjoy full
civil and political liberties. Indeed, the British enacted many illiberal state
security laws, including Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Hong Kong’s
laws on sedition. Colonial divide-and-rule strategies have also exacerbated
ethnic tensions and fueled secessionist movements, as colonial powers
swapped lands and redrew boundaries with little regard for the identity
needs of particular groups.
What is clear is that the colonial experience has left a bitter taste in the
mouths of many Asian citizens, and has made them disinclined to welcome
what they take to be the hypocritical, self-righteous preaching of former
Western oppressors who regularly violated the civil and political rights of
Asians when it was in their political and economic interest to do so. In the
eyes of many Asians, the current human rights policies of Western powers
and the international human rights regime are just one more example of
power politics, the latest variant in a long history of imperialism and
hegemony in which the West seeks to impose its way of life on the Rest.158

157. Poe et al., supra note 15 at 306, 310. Cf. Reilly, supra note 6 (finding that British
colonialization was not statistically significant, although Spanish-Portuguese colonial legacy was
statistically significant, with French colonial legacy associated with higher repression but not reaching
statistically significant levels); Shawna E. Sweeney, Global Transformations, National Institutions, and
Women's Rights: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis, paper presented at the annual meeting of The
America
Political
Science
Association,
Chicago,
Sept.
2,
2004,
available
at
http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
158. See BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Students' Attitudes Toward Human Rights
Surveyed, May 4, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library. In a survey of 547 students from thirteen
universities in China, eighty-two percent claimed that for other countries to initiate anti-China motions
before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights constituted interference in China's internal affairs;
seventy-one percent believed that the true aim of the United States and other countries in censuring
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Although Singapore and Malaysia were most vocal in their criticism
of the liberal biases and hypocrisies of the Western-dominated human
rights movement, hostility and suspicion run much deeper throughout the
region. China has long argued, with some truth, that it is subject to a
double standard.159 There is also a strong current of nationalism in China
that has fed popular discontent with the way China is portrayed in the
media on rights issues.
A broader current of nationalism is rising in various countries in the
region. In Thailand, anger at the IMF and its role in the Asian financial
crisis has fanned a general distrust of international institutions, including
the U.N., as captured in the slogan “the U.N. is not my father.”160 As
noted, both in Thailand and Indonesia, public support for international
rights NGOs and domestic rights commissions has weakened. In South
Korea, rising nationalism is manifest in a tendency to emphasize the
“uniqueness” of Korea and Korean people; in the growing assertion of
sovereignty and independence in foreign relations, particularly with the
U.S.; and in opposition to the economic offshoots of globalization, such as
free-trade agreements, the opening of the service sector in education and
law, and policies to foster increased labor market flexibility. Ironically, all
of these demands for more nationalistic policy may be articulated in terms
of human rights.161 Independence in foreign policy is the natural extension
of a national right to self-determination; opposition to trade liberalization is
supported by the need to protect the subsistence rights of local farmers and
manufacturers; and the adoption of global labor standards arguably must be
opposed to safeguard the rights of Korean workers. Cloaking local
concerns in the diverse language of human rights provides local activists
some leverage in their struggles with international NGOs. International
NGOs, which are highly critical of North Korea, have also clashed with
domestic rights groups who favor reconciliation with North Korea.
Local opposition to universal human rights is not limited to Asia.
Western countries as well have struggled over how best to reconcile a
commitment to universal principles with the complex reality of local
contingencies. However, at least for economically advanced Western
liberal democracies, the norms reflected in the international human rights
corpus are largely consistent with, and indeed the outgrowth of, their own
values and experiences. As politically stable consolidated democracies,
China was to use the human rights issue to attack China and impose sanctions on it, with sixty-nine
percent maintaining that this constituted a form of power politics. Id.
159. See generally Peerenboom, supra note 2.
160. Muntarbhorn, supra note 24.
161. Hahm, supra note 75.
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they do not face the same pressures as many Asian states that are still
struggling to consolidate democracy or to ensure political stability in the
face of separatist movements and other threats. As wealthy countries, they
also have the resources to establish institutions capable of implementing
rule of law, and, were they so inclined, to make good on the promises of
social and economic rights. The “Asian values” movement in part was an
attempt for geopolitically weaker Asian states to forge a common basis so
that Asian countries could demand the same kind of margin of appreciation
on human rights issues as extended to Western countries.162 At the heart of
the argument was the claim that the interpretation and implementation of
rights does and should depend to some degree on local circumstances,
including not just values, but levels of economic development; political
institutions and beliefs; legal institutions, doctrines and practices; ethnic
diversity; the presence of terrorists and other such factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Asian countries vary widely in their rights performances generally, on
specific rights issues, and in the factors that influence the protection of
rights and the outcomes of specific cases. The level of economic
development is clearly a, and usually the most, significant factor. While
money may not be able to buy happiness, it does seem to buy a longer life,
better education, more health care, and even civil and political rights. The
nature of the political regime is also important, but economics come first,
especially at low levels. Given the importance of wealth to rights
performance, comparisons are best made between countries in the same
income categories.
What then does this overview tell us about values in Asia? Asia is
obviously a big place, with tremendous diversity that makes it impossible
to identify a singular set of “Asian values” shared by everyone in Asia. On
the other hand, a pluralism of Asian values is still Asian values. There is
nothing inherently contradictory in noting a diversity of values and still
claiming that they are Asian. Nor need each country within Asia share
every single feature. There may still be dominant patterns within Asia.
The “West” and “liberalism” also encompass a tremendous diversity of
views. Nevertheless, there are still dominant trends in Western thought.
“Liberalism” clearly has a stronger hold than “communitarianism” in the
West, for example, whereas the opposite seems to be true in much of Asia,
although perhaps collectivism is a more apt description than
communitarianism.
162. See Beyond Universalism and Relativism, supra note 1, at 64-70.
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Asian values are by definition the dominant values that exist in Asia.
They form a value cluster with hierarchies and intensities that allow them
to be compared to other value clusters. The individual values that make up
the cluster do not have to be unique to Asia, provided the cluster of values
as a whole, including the relative ranking and weighting of values within
the cluster, is distinguishable from the value clusters of other regions. Nor
do Asian values have to be shared by all people within Asia or exist to the
same degree or intensity or be ranked in the same order in all Asian
countries, provided however that if there are no statistically significant
shared values between a country and the region at large then the country
should be identified as an outlier. There is obvious variation within
countries/cultures, so some people will have values that are in the minority
in their own society but perhaps dominant in others. Nor does it matter that
the current distribution of values is due more to factors such as economic
growth or demographic factors like higher rural-urban ratios rather than
“cultural” explanations such as philosophical traditions or religious beliefs.
Nor is it the case that the current distribution will forever remain the same.
For the moment, however, the distribution is what it is, whatever the
various causes.
Whether focusing on regions, countries, subnational units or
individuals is useful depends on one’s project. Any comparative project
must begin by constructing categories that highlight certain features and
thus simplify to some extent quotidian reality. The problem has not been
that the East and West, Asian values and Western values are constructs, but
that they have been overly simple constructs that lacked a firm empirical
foundation. On the other hand, the shortcoming of the many multiplecountry studies that find greater “collectivism” and acceptance of hierarchy
in Asia is not that they fail to identify real differences along the
individualism versus collectivism or hierarchy versus egalitarianism
continuums. Rather, the problem is that individualism versus collectivism,
and hierarchy versus egalitarianism, are often underdetermining in
predicting the outcomes on many specific issues. Accordingly, the broad
studies are less useful in demonstrating the effects of such differences on a
range of specific issues and in sorting out the interplay of cultural factors
and other factors in explaining differences in outcomes. For that, we need
more detailed studies.163
163. An excellent example of one such study is AUSTRALIA IN ASIA: COMPARING CULTURES
(Anthony Milner & Mary Quilty eds., 1996). Focusing on a variety of practical issues, the various
chapters repeatedly demonstrate four points. First, there is significant diversity within Asia. Second,
the contrast between liberal emphasis on the individual and the emphasis on the collective cuts across
many issues from business ethics to human rights, conceptions of democracy, labor relations, national
security, the media, citizenship, and governance. See, e.g., id. at 11 ("The liberal ideological package—
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This empirical overview suggests that there are some general patterns
on a range of specific issues, and that values are one of the important
factors in determining the outcomes, although not the most determinative
overall. One can see a family of resemblances across a range of issues,
especially in East Asian countries: in the higher priority assigned to social
stability and economic development over civil and political rights; in the
greater willingness to accept limits on free speech; in the emphasis on
education and the use of education to promote national goals;164 in the
superior performance on good governance measures relative to other
countries at similar income levels; in the relatively successful efforts to
maintain social order and fight crime; in the opposition to Western
colonialism and emergence of a strong nationalist discourse or the attempts
to interpret human rights principles in terms of local values and
circumstances. To be sure, there clearly has been and will continue to be
change within the region largely due to greater wealth, urbanization and
modernization. Nevertheless, core values continue to persist, and Asian
countries and the Asian region as a whole continue to exhibit relative
differences with other countries and regions on dimensions such as
individualism versus collectivism and hierarchy versus egalitarianism, even
controlling for wealth. Accordingly, we are likely to see signs of
convergence and divergence on human rights issues in the future, both
interregionally and intraregionally.
The Asian values debate has often been carried on at an excessively
abstract level by advocates of universal human rights and those who
question just how universal rights are. The former have argued that there is
an expansive over-lapping consensus regarding human rights as
demonstrated by ratification of rights covenants. In response, critics argue
that the hard core of universal rights is extremely limited, and that
ratification of rights covenants does not demonstrate a thick consensus on
specific issues. Although there are many rights that people agree are
desirable when stated at very high level of abstraction, agreement at such a
lofty level is not helpful in resolving most pressing social issues. The
broad empirical studies are too general to shed much light on these debates.
a tradition of debate, freedom and individualism, a stress on equality, and abhorrence of a too vigorous
official nationalism—seems to be more, not less, influential when Australia is contrasted with Asian
countries."). Third, the greater emphasis on collectivism does not preclude diversity in any of these
areas as a result of differences in geography, population, language, religion, cultural narratives, and
level of economic development. Fourth, while some convergence with Western liberal democracies is
to be expected as Asian countries modernize, the factors just mentioned will also lead to significant and
persisting divergence.
164. Id. at 98 (noting differences in such fundamental matters as the authority of the teacher and the
process by which knowledge is transferred from teacher to student).
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More detailed studies of particular cases are necessary to determine the
degree of commonality and diversity.
Analysis of particular cases in various Asian countries demonstrates
that there are differences both in terms of legal rules and outcomes in
similar cases even when the laws are similar.165 For instance, all countries
advocate freedom of religion. Yet Malaysia and Singapore, two ethnically
diverse states often linked together as advocates of Asian values, differ
significantly in their approach to religious freedom and minority rights.
Although they face similar problems and share a common concern for
social stability and religious harmony, Malaysia and Singapore have
reached different outcomes on similar cases. Similarly, defamation laws
vary widely within Asia, despite a general commitment to freedom of
speech.
While wealth explains much of the variation within Asia and
elsewhere, the outcomes in specific cases are often driven by complex
patterns of generally applicable and locally specific variables. Broad
similarities in doctrine and principles are juxtaposed with subtle differences
in local circumstances that shape outcomes in particular cases and bring to
the forefront certain issues rather than others within a particular category of
rights. As a result, what may seem like a pragmatic or overlapping
consensus quickly breaks down once one moves beyond discussions about
the desirability of the broad wish list of rights contained in human rights
documents to the difficult issues of the justifications for such rights and
how they are interpreted and implemented in actual cases.
Whether one focuses on regional, country or subnational studies, the
results are worrisome for advocates of universal human rights. Supporters
of universal human rights have sought to discredit the notion of Asian
values by pointing to the tremendous diversity within the region. However,
if such diversity precludes the possibility of common values within the
Asian region, then it also precludes a fortiori the possibility of universal
values.166 Alternatively, one could claim that there are common values
within the Asian region but they are not distinctive. However, what
common values do exist are so abstract and so thin that they lead to widely
165. See generally, THE RIGHTS OF ASIANS TODAY, supra note 14.
166. Because "Asian values" has been tainted from misuse by politically oppressive regimes, one
common suggestion is to replace it with "values in Asia." This change has the salutary effect of
signaling a desire to move away from the overtly political use of the term toward a more sophisticated
approach sensitive to the pluralism within Asia. But eliminating references to "Asian values" and
replacing it with "values in Asia" will not put an end to substantive debates about the universality of
rights or shed any light whatsoever on how rights are to be interpreted or implemented in particular
contexts in Asia. At best, it simply shifts the focus to a less grand level, whether that be country by
country, area of law by area of law, or issue by issue.
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divergent outcomes on specific issues, many of which are not consistent
with current human standards as interpreted by the ICCPR human rights
committee and liberal rights activists. Both the regional studies and more
specific country studies cited herein suggest that the secular liberalism that
provides the thicker ideological basis for the human rights movement today
is not widely accepted within Asian countries.
Drawing sufficiently detailed policy implications from this study is
complicated. Economic growth, rule of law, social and political stability,
and – at least at moderate to high income levels – democracy, are generally
desirable and associated with better rights performance, all else being
equal. Nevertheless, none of them individually nor all of them collectively
guarantee realization of all types of rights across the board. Clearly what
works in one context may not work in another. Given the wide variation in
legal institutions and other factors that influence rights performance, the
international human rights community should be wary of one-size-fits-all
solutions. In light of the diversity of values within Asia and in comparison
to other countries and regions, Asian countries should enjoy a “margin of
appreciation” like that provided European countries by the European Court
of Human Rights. Acknowledging the diversity on moral issues within
Europe, the ECHR has tolerated differences in outcomes particularly in
cases involving national security, sex, sexual orientation and religion.
The results of this study suggest that a wide margin of appreciation
should be extended to three other areas. The first is free speech,
specifically speech that incites hatred or exacerbates ethnic tensions.
Defamation and criticism of the government is another area where legal
standards and practice vary. However, the abuse of defamation laws to
harass political opponents militates against broad deference to governments
in this area.
Secondly, given the indeterminacy of international law and the vastly
different circumstances of particular countries in terms of ethnic and
religious diversity, countries should be allowed a wide margin of
appreciation in deciding how best to ensure cultural rights, including issues
of freedom of religion such as what constitutes abnormal and normal
practices or legitimate groups as opposed to cults.
Thirdly, given the disparities in the levels of wealth and the potentially
destabilizing effect of promising more than the government can deliver,
states should be allowed considerable discretion in the area of social and
economic rights.
Finally, there should be a general appreciation that civil and political
rights are a function of wealth, war and other circumstances, and that the
majority of citizens in different countries may very well decide to draw a
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different balance between the rights of individuals and collective interests
in this area. Recognition of such differences need not lead to an express
doctrine of deference to government decisions to limit rights in the name of
public order, but rather might lead to a more open-minded, careful scrutiny
of the context-specific factors that allegedly justify the restrictions in the
particular case.
At minimum, every attempt should be made to involve groups with
knowledge of the local circumstances in identifying areas for change and in
devising feasible plans for furthering the realization of rights and the lofty
goals contained in international rights documents.
Perhaps most
fundamentally, more attention should be paid to economic development
and poverty reduction because of the devastating effects of poverty and the
importance of economic development to the realization of all categories of
rights. However, acknowledging the importance and desirability of
fostering economic development still leaves unanswered the many practical
issues about how best to achieve economic growth within a particular
country or region.
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Table 1.1
Poverty Index

Country and
Human
Development
Indicator Rank

Human
Poverty Index
(HPI-1)

Population Below Income
Poverty Line
(%)
National

Rank

Value
(%)

$1 a day
19902001

$2 a day
19902001

Poverty
Line
19872000

HPI-1
rank
minus
income
poverty
rank

26

Hong Kong (HI)

..

..

..

..

..

..

30

South Korea (UM)

..

..

<2

<2

..

..

58

Malaysia (M)

..

..

<2

9.3

..

..

43

Chile (UM)

3

4.1

<2

8.7

17.0

1

28

Singapore (HI)

6

6.3

..

..

..

..

65

Brazil (UM)

18

11.4

9.9

23.7

..

-8

74

Thailand (M)

24

12.9

<2

32.5

13.1

16

104

China (LM)

26

14.2

16.1

47.3

4.6

-13

85

Philippines (LM)

28

14.8

14.6

46.4

36.8

-6

106

Iran (LM)

31

16.4

<2

7.3

..

21

112

Indonesia (LI)

33

17.9

7.2

55.4

27.1

7

109

Vietnam (LI)

39

19.9

17.7

63.7

..

-4

121

Nicaragua (LI)

44

24.3

82.3

94.5

47.9

-34

120

Egypt (LM)

47

30.5

3.1

43.9

16.7

20

111

South Africa (UM)

49

31.7

<2

14.5

..

34

127

India (LI)

53

33.1

34.7

79.9

28.

-9

59

Tanzania (LI)

59

36.2

19.9

59.7

41.6

6

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

90

52.0

36.0

64.2

34.9

14
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Table 2.1
Infant Mortality, Life Expectancy, and Primary School Enrollment
Infant mortality rate

Life expectancy at birth

(per 1,000 live births)

(years)

2001

Net Primary School
Enrollment Rate
(% eligible age children)

2001

2001

Hong Kong (HI)

3

Japan (HI)

81.3

Japan (HI)

100

Japan (HI)

3

Hong Kong (HI)

79.7

France (HI)

100

Singapore (HI)

3

France (HI)

78.7

Hong Kong (HI)

99

France (HI)

4

Singapore (HI)

77.8

Taiwan (UM)

99

South Korea (UM)

5

United States (HI)

76.9

South Korea (UM)

99

Taiwan (UM)

6

Chile

75.8

Poland (UM)

98

United States (HI)

7

Taiwan (UM)

75.6

Malaysia (M)

98

Poland (UM)

8

South Korea (UM)

75.2

Brazil (UM)

97

Malaysia (M)

8

Poland (UM)

73.6

United States (HI)

95

Chile (UM)

10

Malaysia (M)

72.8

Vietnam (LI)

95

Romania (LM)

19

China (LM)

70.6

Singapore (HI)

94

Thailand (M)

24

Romania (LM)

70.5

Romania (LM)

93

Philippines (LM)

29

Iran (LM)

69.8

Philippines (LM)

93

Vietnam (LI)

30

Philippines (LM)

69.5

China (LM)

93

Brazil

31

Nicaragua (LI)

69.1

Egypt (LM)

93

China (LM)

31

Thailand (M)

68.9

Indonesia (LI)

92

Indonesia (LI)

33

Vietnam (LI)

68.6

Chile (UM)

89

Iran (LM)

35

Egypt (LM)

68.3

South Africa (UM)

89

Egypt (LM)

35

Brazil (UM)

67.8

India (LI)

86

Nicaragua (LI)

36

Indonesia (LI)

66.2

Thailand (M)

85

South Africa (UM)

56

India (LI)

63.3

Nicaragua (LI)

81

India (LI)

67

South Africa (UM)

50.9

Zimbabwe (LI)

80

Zimbabwe (LI)

76

Tanzania (LI)

Tanzania (LI)

104

Zimbabwe (LI)

44
35.4

Iran (LM)

74

Tanzania (LI)

47
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Table 3.1
Public Spending Priorities (% GDP)
Public

Public

Country and Human

Expenditure on

Expenditure on

Development Indicator Rank

Education

Health

1998-2000

2000

2001

Military
Expenditure

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

10.4

3.1

3.2

58

Malaysia (M)

6.2

1.5

2.2

17

France (HI)

5.8

7.2

2.5

111

South Africa (UM)

5.5

3.7

1.6

29

Taiwan (UM)

5.5

0.4

1.5

74

Thailand (M)

5.4

2.1

1.4

35

Poland (UM)

5.0

4.2

1.9

121

Nicaragua (LI)

5.0

2.3

1.1

26

Hong Kong

4.9*

1.6

..

7

United States (HI)

4.8

5.8

3.1

65

Brazil (UM)

4.7

3.4

1.5

106

Iran (LM)

4.4

2.5

4.8

43

Chile (UM)

4.2

3.1

2.9

85

Philippines (LM)

4.2

1.6

1.0

127

India (LI)

4.1

0.9

2.5

30

South Korea (UM)

3.8

2.6

2.8

120

Egypt (LM)

3.7

1.8

2.6

28

Singapore (HI)

3.7

1.2

5.0

9

Japan (HI)

3.5

6.0

1.0

72

Romania (LM)

3.5

1.9

2.5

160

Tanzania (LI)

2.1

2.8

1.3

104

China (LM)

2.1

1.9

2.3

112

Indonesia (LI)

1.0

0.6

1.1

109

Vietnam (LI)

..

1.3

7.9
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Table 4.1
Income Inequality

Country and Human

Share of Income or
Consumption (%)

Development Indicator
1990-2001

Rank

Poorest 20%

Richest 20%

Richest 20%
to
Poorest 20%

Gini
Index (%)

1990-2001

1990-2001

9

Japan (HI)

10.6

35.7

3.4

24.9

72

Romania (LM)

8.2

38.4

4.7

30.3

112

Indonesia (LI)

8.4

43.3

5.2

30.3

30

South Korea (UM)

7.9

37.5

4.7

31.6

35

Poland (UM)

7.8

39.7

5.1

31.6

17

France (HI)

7.2

40.2

5.6

32.7

29

Taiwan (UM)

6.7

41.1

6.2

34.5

120

Egypt (LM)

8.6

43.6

5.1

34.4

109

Vietnam (LI)

8.0

44.5

5.6

36.1

127

India (LI)

8.1

46.1

5.7

37.8

160

Tanzania (LI)

6.8

45.5

6.7

38.2

104

China (LM)

5.9

46.6

8.0

40.3

United States (HI)

5.2

46.4

9.0

40.8

7
28

Singapore (HI)

5.0

49.0

9.7

42.5

106

Iran (LM)

5.1

49.9

9.7

43.0

74

Thailand (M)

6.1

50.0

8.3

43.2

26

Hong Kong (HI)

5.3

50.7

9.7

43.4

85

Philippines (LM)

5.4

52.3

9.7

46.1

58

Malaysia (M)

4.4

54.3

12.4

49.2

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

4.6

55.7

12.0

56.8

43

Chile (UM)

3.2

61.3

19.3

57.5

111

South Africa (UM)

2.0

66.5

33.6

59.3

121

Nicaragua (LI)

2.3

63.6

27.9

60.3

65

Brazil (UM)

2.2

64.1

29.7

60.7
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91.6

91.3

Eastern Europe

65.0

60.5

57.7

63.2

56.5

54.7

61.2

51.2

53.3

58.4

53.2

54.9

East Asia

50.3

54.6

50.5

42.8

47.5

44.4

Middle East and North Africa

28.6

40.1

49.9

44.9

54.2

54.7

South Asia

29.6

32.4

48.1

35.3

42.1

41.5

Sub-Saharan Africa

31.0

34.8

28.9

30.6

30.5

32.4

Former Soviet Union

22.7

31.1

21.7

25.4

20.4

16.8

Latin American
and Caribbean

Corruption

Rule of Law

91.9

Control of

Regulatory Quality

91.6

Government

87.2

Effectiveness

91.3

Political Stability

OECD

Region and Human

Accountability

Development Indicator Rank

Voice and

Table 5.1
Regional Governance Indicators (2002 percentile rank)
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7

United States (HI)

90.9

56.2

91.2

91.2

91.8

92.3

9

Japan (HI)

79.3

90.3

84.5

78.9

88.7

85.1

17

France (HI)

88.4

70.8

90.7

85.6

87.6

89.2

26

Hong Kong (HI)

53.5

85.4

88.7

90.7

86.6

90.2

28

Singapore (HI)

65.7

91.9

100.0

99.5

93.3

99.5

29

Taiwan (UM)

74.2

70.3

82.5

80.9

80.9

77.3

30

South Korea (UM)

67.7

60.5

79.4

76.3

77.8

66.5

35

Poland (UM)

83.3

69.7

71.1

71.1

70.6

69.1

43

Chile (UM)

84.3

85.9

90.2

90.2

87.1

90.7

58

Malaysia (M)

42.4

61.6

68.6

68.6

69.6

68.0

65

Brazil (UM)

58.1

48.1

63.4

63.4

50.0

56.7

74

Thailand (M)

57.1

62.7

65.5

65.5

62.4

53.6

72

Romania (LM)

61.1

58.4

55.7

55.7

54.1

45.4

85

Philippines (LM)

54.0

29.7

57.7

57.7

38.1

37.6

104

China (LM)

10.1

51.4

40.2

40.2

51.5

42.3

106

Iran (LM)

18.2

25.9

8.2

8.2

33.5

44.3

109

Vietnam (LI)

10.6

61.1

25.3

25.3

44.8

33.0

111

South Africa (UM)

70.7

42.7

69.1

69.1

59.8

67.5

112

Indonesia (LI)

34.8

12.4

34.0

26.3

23.2

6.7

127

India (LI)

60.6

22.2

54.1

43.8

57.2

49.5

120

Egypt (LM)

22.2

34.1

46.9

38.1

57.7

47.9

121

Nicaragua (LI)

52.0

47.6

17.5

39.7

32.0

39.7

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

7.1

8.6

22.2

4.1

5.7

6.2

160

Tanzania (LI)

37.9

35.7

36.1

33.5

38.7

15.5

Corruption

Control of

Rule of Law

Regulatory Quality

Effectiveness

Government

Accountability

Voice and

Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

Political Stability

Table 6.1
Quality of Governance (Percentile Rank, 2002)
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Table 7.1
Crime Statistics (rate per 100,000) 1997-2002
Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

Total Crime

Murder

Rape

7

United States (HI)

4160.51

5.61

31.77

9

Japan (HI)

2300.77

1.1

1.85

17 France (HI)

6932.26

4.07

17.63

26 Hong Kong (HI)

1085.64

1.03

1.41

28 Singapore (HI)

703.84

0.8

2.81

29 Taiwan (UM)

2179.03

5.13

10.16

30 South Korea (UM)

1664.06

2.18

4.29

35 Poland (UM)

3634.84

3.15

6.09

43 Chile (UM)

1496.92

4.54

9.97

58 Malaysia (M)

729.71

2.1

5.78

65 Brazil (UM)

927.41

22.98

8.5

72 Romania (LM)

2207.05

7.44

8.34

74 Thailand (M)

245.53

8.07

6.17

-

7.85

4.21

133.82

2.16

-

-

-

-

85 Philippines (LM)
104 China (LM)
106 Iran (LM)
109 Vietnam (LI)
111 South Africa (UM)
112 Indonesia (LI)
120 Egypt (LM)
121 Nicaragua (LI)

83.56

1.08

-

8176.04

114.84

121.13

63.48

0.8

0.73

-

-

-

1372.27

24.03

26.03

671.2

3.93

1.6

145 Zimbabwe (LI)

6560.61

10.15

38.38

160 Tanzania (LI)

1647.98

7.95

10.05

127 India (LI)
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Table 7.1 cont.
Crime Statistics (rate per 100,000) 1997-2002
Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

Theft

Drug Offense

Incarceration

United States (HI)

3804.58

539.92

701

9

Japan (HI)

1871.13

21.68

54

17

France (HI)

4224.57

182.19

93

26

Hong Kong (HI)

623.16

36.77

184

28

Singapore (HI)

415.5

85.08

388

29

Taiwan (UM)

1473.03

111.13

250

30

South Korea (UM)

386.31

8.97

125

35

Poland (UM)

1727.46

93.65

211

43

Chile (UM)

705.66

16.68

204

58

Malaysia (M)

581.43

78.95

161

65

Brazil (UM)

7

-

46.29

160

2.04

199

72

Romania (LM)

1028.33

74

Thailand (M)

90

438.13

401

85

Philippines (LM)

10.21

14.53

94

87.75

3.92

184

104 China (LM)
106 Iran (LM)
109 Vietnam (LI)
111 South Africa (UM)
112 Indonesia (LI)

-

-

226

31.41

11.26

71

3565.81

111.85

402

45.26

3.77

38

-

-

121

121 Nicaragua (LI)

579.97

22.79

143

127 India (LI)

44.01

2.25

29

145 Zimbabwe (LI)

1958.11

57.03

160

160 Tanzania (LI)

194.11

13.39

120

120 Egypt (LM)
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Table 8.1
Social Order: Divorce Rates, Suicide Rates, Young Mothers
Divorce Rate

Suicide Rates

Births by Mothers

(per 1,000)

(per 100,000)

Between Age
15-19

Country and Human Development
Indicator Rank

(per 1000
1996-2000

1991-2002

population 19952000)

7

United States (HI)

4.19

10.85

9.14

9

Japan (HI)

1.98

25.3

0.70

17

France (HI)

1.98

17.75

1.58

26

Hong Kong (HI)

1.95

13.25

1.08

28

Singapore (HI)

1.20

9.45

1.07

29

Taiwan (UM)

-

13.59

0.50

30

South Korea (UM)

2.52

13.55

0.63

35

Poland (UM)

1.09

15.4

4.12

43

Chile (UM)

0.42

5.8

10.19

58

Malaysia (M)

-

-

4.06

65

Brazil (UM)

0.60

4.2

19.05

72

Romania (LM)

1.40

12.35

7.93

74

Thailand (M)

-

4

12.41

85

Philippines (LM)

-

2.1

11.80

104

China (LM)

-

13.9

0.97

106

Iran (LM)

0.81

0.2

13.86

109

Vietnam (LI)

111

South Africa (UM)

-

-

6.52

0.83

-

21.34

112

Indonesia (LI)

-

-

15.10

120

Egypt (LM)

1.17

0.05

14.36

121

Nicaragua (LI)

-

3.45

45.06

127

India (LI)

-

10.65

12.52

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

-

7.9

31.34

160

Tanzania (LI)

-

-

39.37
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Table 9.1
GDP with and without Purchase Price Parity Adjustment, 2001

Country and Human
Development Indicator Rank

GDP

GDP

GDP per

(US$

(PPP US$

Capita

Capita

billions)

billions)

(US$)

(PPP US$)

GDP per

7

United States (HI)

10,065.3

9,792.5

35,277

34,230

9

Japan (HI)

4,141.4

3,193.0

32,601

25,130

26

Hong Kong (HI)

17

France (HI)

28

161.9

167.1

24,074

24,850

1,309.8

1,4020.0

22,129

23,990

Singapore (HI)

85.6

93.7

20,733

22,680

29

Taiwan (UM)

281.2

401.0

12,621

18,000

30

South Korea (UM)

422.2

714.2

8,917

15,090

111

South Africa (UM)

113.3

488.2

2,620

11,290

35

Poland (UM)

176.3

365.3

4,561

9.450

43

Chile (UM)

66.5

141.6

4,314

9,190

58

Malaysia (M)

88.0

208.3

3,699

8,750

65

Brazil (UM)

502.5

1,268.6

2,915

7,360

74

Thailand (M)

114.7

391.7

1,874

6,400

106

Iran (LM)

114.1

387.2

1,767

6,000

72

Romania (LM)

38.7

130.7

1,728

5,830

104

China (LM)

1,159.0

5,111.2

911.0

4,020

85

Philippines (LM)

71.4

301.1

912.0

3,840

120

Egypt (LM)

98.5

229.4

1,511.0

3,520

112

Indonesia (LI)

145.3

615.2

695.0

2,940

127

India (LI)

477.3

2,930.0

462.0

2,840

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

9.1

29.3

706.0

2,800

121

Nicaragua (LI)

4.0

11.7

754.7

2,200

109

Vietnam (LI)

32.7

164.5

411.0

2,070

160

Tanzania (LI)

9.3

18.0

271.0

520
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Figure 4.1
Wealth Effect (GDP) on Rights Performance
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Table 10.1
Correlation of Wealth and Measures of Development

All

Africa

Asia

Australia and
Pacific

Caribbean

Former Soviet
Influence

Latin America

Middle East

Western Europe

Region

0.92
**

0.88
**

0.93
**

0.97
**

0.86
**

0.97
**

0.88
**

0.93
**

0.94
**

0.93
**

0.87
**

0.92
**

0.98
*

0.89
*

0.97
**

0.90
**

0.92
**

0.83
**

Rule of Law

0.82
**

0.58
**

0.91
**

0.95
**

0.90
**

0.81
**

0.64
**

0.89
**

0.92
**

Government
Effectiveness

0.77
**

0.49
**

0.90
**

0.98
**

0.92
**

0.85
**

0.69
**

0.78
**

0.91
**

Control of
Corruption

0.76
**

0.55
**

0.88
**

0.96
**

0.81
**

0.83
**

0.67
**

0.77
**

0.86
**

Voice and
Accountability

0.62
**

0.29

0.50
*

0.94
**

0.75
*

0.73
**

0.34

0.18

0.85
**

PTS 2002
(AI & State)

-0.40
**

-0.22

-0.42

-0.74

-0.71
*

-0.21

0.10

-0.25

-0.48
*

N

174

41

19

6

10

20

20

15

23

Measure

Human
development index
(HDI) 2001
Gender-related
development index
(GDI) 2001

Cell entries are Pearson’s R coefficients. Dependent variable is natural log of GDP per capita
*p < .05, **p < .01
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Table 11.1
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Growth Rate
Country and Human Development Indicator
Rank

Annual Growth Rate GDP per Capita (%)
1975-2001

1990-2001

104

China (LM)

8.2

8.8

109

Vietnam (LI)

4.9

6.0

29

Taiwan (UM)

8.9

5.6

30

South Korea (UM)

6.2

4.7

43

Chile (UM)

4.1

4.7

28

Singapore (HI)

5.1

4.4

35

Poland (UM)

..

4.4

127

India (LI)

3.2

4.0

58

Malaysia (M)

4.1

3.9

74

Thailand (M)

5.4

3.0

120

Egypt (LM)

2.8

2.5

112

Indonesia (LI)

4.3

2.3

26

Hong Kong (HI)

4.5

2.1

7

United States (HI)

2.0

2.1

Iran (LM)

-0.6

2.0

17

France (HI)

1.7

1.5

65

Brazil (UM)

0.8

1.4

9

Japan (HI)

2.6

1.0

106

85

Philippines (LM)

0.1

1.0

160

Tanzania (LI)

0.3

0.4

111

South Africa (UM)

-0.7

0.2

72

Romania (LM)

-1.3

-0.1

121

Nicaragua (LI)

-4.0

-0.1

145

Zimbabwe (LI)

0.2

-0.2
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SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS FOR TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Mark Gibney, Political Science Terror Scale, available at
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Figure 2.1: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Figure 3.1: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003,
Human Development Indicators, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_HDI.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,2004). LI refers
to lower income countries; LM to lower middle income; M to middle income; UM to upper
middle income; HI to high income.
Table 1.1: Columns 1-2: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2003, Human Development Indicators, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_HDI.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). HPI
rank is determined on the basis of the HPI-1 values. The HPI value is a composite score based
on standard of living measurements including life expectancy (probability of death before age
40, education level (adult illiteracy rate), access to water (population without sustainable access
to water), and access to food (children under-weight for age). The aggregation rule is specified
in Technical Note 1 of the UNDP 2003 Report, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_backmatter_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Column 3-5: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003
(World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM).
The final column is calculated on the basis of ranking data in columns 1 and PPP$1 data
in column 3. A positive final column figure indicates that the country performs better in income
poverty than in human poverty, a negative the opposite.
Table 2.1: Column 1: UNICEF (THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND), THE STATE
(New York: Oxford University Press 2003), available at
http://www.unicef.org/sowc03/tables/table1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Column 2: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2002 REVISION POPULATION
DATABASE, available at http://esa.un.org/unpp/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Column 3: UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION FOR EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE,
UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, AP – Gross and Net Enrollment Ratios, Primary Table,
available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau. Taiwan
Statistics Bureau, 2002 Social Indicators Contents, available at
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 2003

Table 3.1: Column 1: UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION FOR EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
CULTURE, UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, RE – Public Expenditure on Education as %
of GNI, GDP, and Government Expenditure Table, available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004). Hong Kong education figure from report to ICESCR Committee.
Column 2: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003
(World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM).
Column 3: STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI Data on
Military Expenditure, database available at
http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_data_index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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Taiwan data is based on statistics compiled by the Taiwan Statistics Bureau. Taiwan
Statistics Bureau, 2002 Social Indicators Contents, available at
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs2/92chy/catalog.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Table 4.1: The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators 2003 (World
Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM).
For Taiwan data see Report on The Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan
Area, Republic of China, available at http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/doc4/91/book/Year09.doc
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004). Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
Table 5.1: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Table 6.1: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Table 7.1: Column 1-5: INTERPOL, INTERNATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS: COUNTRY
REPORT, at http://www.interpol.int/Public/Statistics/ICS/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Column 6: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, SCHOOL OF LAW AT KING’S
COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, at
http://www.prisonstudies.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). Some Taiwan, U.S. and Singapore
data came from compilations by national statistic offices. Taiwan HDI rank is an estimate.
Table 8.1: Column 1: UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 2000, Table 25 –
Divorces and Crude Divorce Rates: 1996-2000, available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/DYB2000/Table25.xls (last visited Oct. 30,
2004).
Column 2: WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Suicide Rates per 100,000 by country, year
and gender (Table), at http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004)
Column 3: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2002 REVISION POPULATION
DATABASE, available at http://esa.un.org/unpp/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). Taiwan HDI rank is
an estimate.
Table 9.1: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003
(World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM.); aggregates calculated for the Human
Development Report Office by the World Bank.
Figure 4.1: Good Government Practice: Combination of World Bank Indicators for Rule
of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Control of Corruption. See infra, Table 6.1.
Human Development Index: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, Human Development Indicators, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/index.html (last visited October 30,2004).
Voice and Accountability: THE WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE MATTERS III:
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002 (2003) available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Physical Integrity: Mark Gibney, Political Science Terror Scale, available at
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
Table 10.1: Figure 4.1, broken down by region. Table 10.1 illustrates the relationship
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between per capita GDP and various measures of development, across all countries and within
regions. Across all countries the relationship is highly significant (p < .01), but the strength of
the correlation varies. The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is correlated strongly
with per capita GDP (r = .92), but physical integrity (PTS) bears a relatively weak correlation (r
= -.40). If we square these coefficients to compute r-square (as in regression), we can say that
per capita GDP explains 85% of the variance in HDI across countries, but only 16% of the
variance in physical integrity. The same calculation can be made for the other measures of
development, which are ranked in declining order for all countries. Analysis of these variables
within regions indicates variation in the relationship between wealth and development, but the
same pattern is still largely evident. Where no relationship exists (e.g., Voice and
Accountability in the Middle East) it is due to the lack of variance within the region.
Table 11.1: UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2003, Human Development Indicators, GDP per capita Annual Growth Rate (%) Table,
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_113_1_1.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2004).

